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Investing in institutions for cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Alexander Smith*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies (SSPS), Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), 100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA 01609, USA
Xi Wen
Affiliation:
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies (SSPS), Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), 100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA 01609, USA
*

Abstract

We examine the effects of endogenizing contribution productivity in a repeated public good game. In our experimental treatment, subjects collectively decide (by voting) how much to invest in augmenting the technology for producing the public good, and subsequently make individual voluntary contributions to provision. In the control, contribution productivity is exogenous. Contributions in the two treatments are similar.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2017

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