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Lying in two dimensions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Diogo GeraldesOpen the ORCID record for Diogo Geraldes[Opens in a new window],
Franziska HeinickeOpen the ORCID record for Franziska Heinicke[Opens in a new window] and
Stephanie RosenkranzOpen the ORCID record for Stephanie Rosenkranz[Opens in a new window]
Diogo Geraldes*
Affiliation:
School of Economics and Geary Institute, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Franziska Heinicke*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
Stephanie Rosenkranz*
Affiliation:
Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
*
e-mail: diogogeraldes@gmail.com
f.heinicke@uni-mannheim.de
s.rosenkranz@uu.nl
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Abstract

The expanding literature on lying has exclusively considered lying behavior within a one-dimensional context. While this has been an important first step, many real-world contexts involve the possibility of simultaneously lying in more than one dimension (e.g., reporting one’s income and expenses in a tax declaration). We experimentally investigate individual lying behavior in one- and two-dimensional contexts to understand how the multi-dimensionality of a decision affects lying behavior. Our paper provides the first evidence regarding the pure effect of dimensionality on lying behavior. Using a two-dimensional die-roll task, we show that participants distribute lies unevenly across dimensions, which results in greater over-reporting of the lower-outcome die.

Keywords

LyingHonestyMulti-dimensionalLab experimentLab-in-the-field experiment

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorC93: Field ExperimentsH26: Tax Evasion and AvoidanceD82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , June 2023, pp. 34 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2022.

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