Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2026
The aim of the present work is to provide evidence for two debates in the formal literature on evidentiality: (i) whether the evidential content of evidential elements is in the scope of (certain) operators, and (ii) whether the evidential content can be directly assented/rejected or challenged. We argue, based on the main semantic and pragmatic properties of the Basque reportative particle omen, that, on the one hand, evidential content can have narrow scope within certain operators, and, on the other hand, it can be rejected (contrary to what is claimed to happen crosslinguistically). Based on these conclusions, we contend that the role of omen is best interpreted as contributing to the truth conditions or the propositional content of the utterance, and not to its illocutionary force or as a presupposition trigger. We argue that, by using omen, speakers assert that the reported proposition has been stated (or written) by someone other than themselves. Omen has no other semantic meaning. In our view, the speaker's expression of uncertainty often attributed to omen, if it is present, belongs to the pragmatic content of the utterance and, more precisely, is a generalized conversational implicature of the omen-utterance. Grice's (1989a [1975], 1989b [1978]) cancelability ‘test’ and the data from several corpora support our conclusion. The speaker's expression of uncertainty is explicitly or contextually cancelable, and we found many examples in which the speaker's certainty about either the truth or falsity of the reported proposition is clear. In addition, inspired by Korta & Perry 2011a, we distinguish between three contents, or sets of truth conditions, involved in an omen-utterance, relative to the possible status of the original speaker. Moreover, the results of another test (which can be called the reportability test) show that speakers tend not to use omen to report nonliteral contents (particularized conversational implicatures and presuppositions, at least).
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 43rd annual meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea, in Vilnius, the ILCLI Seminar on Language and Communication, the pragmatics reading group of the Linguistics department at UCL, the Nature of Evidentiality conference in Leiden, and the 2nd IIFs-ILCLI Workshop on Logic, Cognition, and Language, Mexico City. We would like to thank Kasper Boye, Richard Breheny, Martine Bruil, Eros Corazza, Bert Cornillie, Carmén Curcó, Ricardo Etxepare, Martina Faller, Thiago Galery, Ekain Garmendia, Joana Garmendia, Lorena Gil de Montes, Bittor Hidalgo, Mikhail Kissine, Jesus M. Larrazabal, Tyler Peterson, María Ponte, Nausicaa Pouscoulous, Mathias Schenner, Nicola Spotorno, Kate Scott, Ye Tian, Jyrki Tuomainen, and Björn Wiemer for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Robyn Carston for her helpful comments regarding some issues in this article. The responsibility for any remaining mistakes is ours, of course. This work was partially supported by grants from the Basque Government(IT323-10 andIT780-13) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (FFI2009-08574 and FFI2012-37726). The second author is a researcher in the postdoctoral program of the Department of Education, Universities, and Research of the Basque Government.