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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 April 2026
In order to ascertain whether and to what extent linguistics is entitled to the name of a science, we must remember that in Modern English the term ‘science’ may be understood in two different ways, viz. : (1) in a broad sense, as the equivalent of the German word Wissenschaft, i.e., scholarly knowledge; (2) in a more modern and more technical sense, so as to be applied exclusively to branches of learning concerned with permanent and invariable relations, such as mathematics, chemistry, physics. These and similar sciences, it is claimed, are able to make predictions for the future. If interpreted in this way, the term would not be applicable even to the evolutionary branches of natural science, such as geology and biology. Whether or not we approve of limiting the scope of ‘science’ in this manner, we certainly cannot close our eyes to the fundamental difference as to aims and method between abstract science and the study of natural phenomena from the viewpoint of evolution or progress.
1 See, e.g., W. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences (1837) and his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840).
2 I would refer in this connection to an able study written by an American scholar, namely : Grammar and Thinking, a Study of the Working Conceptions in Syntax, by Albert D. Sheffield (New York, 1912).
3 As to the method and the general aspect of historical studies, a reference must suffice here to the first two chapters of E. Bernheim's Lehrbuch der historischen Methode (5th and 6th edition, Leipzig, 1908).