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Thinking Nonsociologically about Sociological Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Extract

Nietzsche is a notoriously difficult philosopher to follow. As he himself wrote, he was not interested in followers. Those who read Nietzsche and care to engage in his thought, then, cannot say that they have not been warned as to its inhospitable character.

That that character is still an issue becomes manifest in two of the four responses to “Genealogy and Jurisprudence.” The responses of Frank Munger and of Christine B. Harrington and John Brigham fail to grasp what is at stake in the claim that Nietzsche can help us to think about “the complicated character of current relations between law and social science” (GJ4 at 554).

Information

Type
Rejoinder
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1994 

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