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Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision Theory and Tax Compliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Abstract

Deterrence models generally predict compliance patterns based solely on the subjective probability and utility of outcomes associated with alternative actions. Yet recent work in behavioral decision theory suggests that compliance decisions may also be affected by how the risks of noncompliance are described and how the decisionmaker's preferences are expressed. We report five experiments that examine how the cognitive heuristics evoked by these descriptive and procedural variables affect tax compliance. Using tax decision problems involving how to choose a tax professional, whether to take a questionable deduction, and how to approach an impending tax audit, we find that taxpayer preferences are significantly influenced by descriptive and procedural variables that traditional expected utility models ignore. We discuss the implications of these results for (1) extending compliance theory to understand a broader range of compliance behavior and (2) utilizing cognitive heuristics to predict the consequences of various enforcement policies.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 by The Law and Society Association

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