This study reanalyzes data collected by David Chambers on the enforcement of child support orders in Michigan. It finds that organizational factors interact with sanction factors to determine levels of general deterrence. Where the agency charged with enforcing child support orders, the Friend of the Court, is proactive and jail is a relatively common punishment for those who persist in not paying, overall collection rates are markedly higher than where neither or only one of these factors exist. The study also examines special deterrence and finds a special deterrent effect apparently associated with the experience of being jailed for failing to pay support. In the course of the investigation a number of contingencies important to deterrence theory are identified, and a behavioral response to threat—the avoidance response—is defined.

Discussion about slavery and law has been raised recently to a high level of abstraction, but important aspects of the relationship remain unexamined. Under what circumstances were masters held liable for the damage that resulted from the wrongs of slaves? The question of distributing the burdens of accidents is a matter of policy, and involves important questions of power and responsibility. But, within an historical context, the range of choices open to a society is neither infinite nor static. This study suggests that legal traditions, styles of reasoning, and, above all, social relationships and perceptions (including those between slaveholders and nonslaveholders) help unravel the policy choices Southerners made in the years before the Civil War.

German prepaid legal insurance is growing both in terms of number of households insured and in terms of extending coverage to new legal areas. Fears for a litigation explosion, however, can be shown to be unfounded—just as are hopes that legal insurance would remove social inequalities of access to law. The use of legal insurance turns out to be much more limited than could have been expected. Major effects on financing lawsuits occurred only in defense against traffic fines and regulating traffic accidents. Litigation behavior as measured by indicators of litigiousness (such as risking a lawsuit with poor chance for success, resisting settlement, filing an appeal) does not seem to be affected by removing cost considerations. It appears that social costs determine inclination to litigate to a greater degree than do financial costs.

On the basis of data dealing with the processing of labor grievances by state institutions in Chile in the period of 1970-1972, the author argues that litigiousness—the propensity to pursue grievances—was growing during that time. This increased litigiousness may be traced to the overall process of rapid sociopolitical change, in particular the growing political awareness of certain sectors of wage earners. The Labor Inspectorate responded positively to increased demand for justice, and encouraged socially well-focused grievance behavior by providing more adequate remedies. The labor courts, in contrast, were insensitive to the process of change. They showed no interest in developing an institutional assertiveness, either favoring or impeding aggrieved workers filing suit. Developments in litigiousness and litigation rates are analyzed in the light of the macro-social process of change that took place at the time.

This paper examines the effects of the abrogation of one common-law doctrine—“charitable immunity”—on the operation and viability of one charitable institution—the hospital—in 24 states over the period 1951-1971. Four models of the effects of abrogation are considered. To test these models, I conceptualize the termination of immunity as an experimental treatment in an interrupted time-series design. I conclude that abrogation led to changes of quite varied magnitude in different states. Apart from abrogation, the onset of Medicare and Medicaid, and changes in the economic environment had considerable effects on hospital costs. In states abrogating after the beginning of federal intervention in medical care, judicial doctrine had no discernible impact on the costs of hospitals.