In the criminal law it is common to distinguish between motive and intention. One of the main reasons for so doing is that in criminal law we are concerned with the wrongfulness of an action in itself and not the agent's own moral evaluation of that action. For this reason, intention has become central to assessing criminal liability. But a similar problem arises with regard to the term intention. This is because whether or not an agent intends a particular consequence depends upon whether or not it was one of the reasons (that is, explanatory reasons) for which she acted. However, we ought to be interested in the reasons that actually applied to those actions (guiding reasons). Hence, the concept of oblique intention applies where the agent realised that a harmful consequence of her action was virtually certain even though it was not a reason for her action. Some writers suggest that this problem can be solved by including consequences brought about intentionally as well as intended consequences within the concept of intention. And this, they argue, is because the use of the adverb is (either conceptually or causally) related to our moral evaluation of an action. In this essay I show that this is not so. The concept of intention is wholly descriptive. Consequently, we require a suitable supplement or alternative to the concept of intention to reflect the highest degree of moral responsibility for the harmful consequences of our actions.