1. B Dylan ‘Dignity’ (Columbia Records, 1991), cited in C McCrudden ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19 Eur J Int’ L 655 at 655.

2. See eg McCrudden, ibid; J Waldron ‘How law protects dignity’ (2012) 71 Camb L J 200; D Luban Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

3. C Dupré The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015); hereafter TAOD.

4. See eg A Barak Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); M Düwell et al (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); C McCrudden (ed) Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

5. TAOD, above n 3, ch 1.

6. See CP Cavafy ‘Ithaca’ in C. P. Cavafy: Complete Poems, tr D Mendelsohn (New York: HarperCollins, 2014).

7. TAOD, above n 3, pp 140, 165–170.

8. Ibid, chs 2–3.

9. Ibid, pp 38–52.

10. Ibid, pp 49–50.

11. Ibid, p 58.

12. Ibid, chs 2–3.

13. It focuses particularly on the EU and ECHR level, as well as certain national jurisdictions: ibid, ch 1.

14. See, on this, C McCrudden ‘In pursuit of human dignity: an introduction to current debates’ in McCrudden, above n 4, pp 54–58. The collection edited by McCrudden is an excellent sample of such conversations. See also Düwell et al, above n 4.

15. TAOD, above n 3, p 13, citing T Honderich The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005) p 638.

16. TAOD, above n 3, p 7.

17. Ibid, pp 1–4.

18. Ibid, p 82.

19. Ibid, p 3.

20. Ibid, p 17.

21. Ibid, p 77. On the absolute character – or inviolability – of the right enshrined in Art 3 of the ECHR, see N Mavronicola ‘What is an “absolute right”? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) Hum Rts L Rev 723. But this is not uncontested: see S Greer ‘Is the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment really “absolute” in international human rights law?’ (2015) 15 Hum Rts L Rev 101.

22. See TAOD, above n 3, ch 4.

23. Dupré clarifies that this is not a gendered account of the human person: ibid, p 30 at fn 8.

24. Ibid, p 177.

25. Ibid, chs 2–3.

26. Ibid, ch 4.

27. Ibid, chs 6–7.

28. Ibid, chs 5–7.

29. Ibid, pp 31–33.

30. Ibid, pp 33–36.

31. Ibid, pp 37–38.

32. Ibid, ch 5.

33. Ibid, p 154.

34. Ibid, pp 137, 139.

35. Ibid, ch 6.

36. Ibid, pp 151–156.

37. Ibid, p 195. See, on the ‘total market’, A Supiot The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs the Total Market, tr S Brown (London: Verso, 2012).

38. TAOD, above n 3, p 177.

39. Ibid, pp 151–156.

40. Ibid, pp 156–160.

41. Ibid, pp 58–61.

42. Ibid, p 177.

43. Ibid, pp 184–185, citing A Barak The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) pp 20–21; and TAOD, above n 3, p 190.

44. TAOD, above n 3, p 171.

45. Ibid, pp 46–47.

46. On multilevel constitutionalism, see eg I Pernice ‘Multilevel constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) 27 Eur L Rev 511; M Kumm ‘Who is the final arbiter of constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ (1999) 36 Common Market L Rev 351. For a nuanced account on the enduring relevance of ‘sovereignties’ in Strasbourg (ECtHR) rather than Luxembourg (CJEU), see D Feldman ‘Sovereignties in Strasbourg’ in R Rawlings, P Leyland and A L Young (eds) Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European, and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

47. TAOD, above n 3, pp 182–193.

48. Ibid, p 189. On human dignity being ‘interlocked’ across Europe's jurisdictions, see ibid, pp 94–99.

49. Ibid, p 190.

50. Ibid, p 192. Dupré additionally makes some interesting remarks regarding constituent power and constituted power being blurred on the dignity-democracy paradigm, which merit further elaboration, particularly in terms of how they relate to crises (including crises of constitutionalism): ibid, p 191.

51. On constitutionalism and ‘militant democracy’, see eg J Antonio-Santos ‘Constitutionalism, resistance and militant democracy’ (2015) 28(3) Ratio Juris 392.

52. Habermas identifies human dignity as Janus-faced in its moral and legal aspects – see J Habermas ‘The concept of dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights’ (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464 at 470. In Dupré's account, however, I propose that dignity operates as Janus beyond the duality of its moral and legal aspects.

53. Dupré repeatedly emphasises that her vision of human dignity is of a ‘secular concept’: see TAOD, above n 3, pp 18–21, 170.

54. Ibid, pp 21–23.

55. Ibid, p 170.

56. Ibid, p 178.

57. On the power, and duty, to protect the time of mankind, see ibid, p 152.

58. On recognising human dignity as the foundation of human rights in the UK, see B Douglas ‘Undignified rights: the importance of a basis in dignity for the possession of human rights in the United Kingdom’ [2015] Pub L 241.

59. TAOD, above n 3, p 15.

60. Much has been written on the state of exception, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. See eg G Agamben State of Exception, tr K Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

61. TAOD, above n 3, p 15.

62. Dupré is aware of this issue – in TAOD (ibid, ch 8), she provides a measured but optimistic response.

63. Indeed, Tasioulas suggests that non-human animals may be said to have species-specific dignity: see J Tasioulas ‘Human dignity and the foundations of human rights’ in McCrudden, above n 4, p 307.

64. See Tasioulas, ibid, p 305; see also TAOD, above n 3, p 35.

65. TAOD, above n 3, p 60.

66. On this premise, see Habermas, above n 52; J Waldron ‘Citizenship and dignity’ in McCrudden, above n 4.

67. TAOD, above n 3, p 86.

68. Ibid, p 103.

69. Ibid, p 21.

70. Ibid, p 86.

71. Ibid, p 88.

72. Ibid, p 132.

73. Ibid, p 99.

74. Ibid, p 87.

75. Ibid, p 22.

76. Ibid, p 86.

77. Ibid, p 87.

78. Ibid, p 18.

79. Ibid, p 111.

80. Ibid, ch 4.

81. Ibid, p 13.

82. Ibid, p 21.

83. Ibid, p 103.

84. Ibid, p 94.

85. Ibid, p 21.

86. Ibid, p 22.

87. This is the case throughout TAOD.

88. Ibid, p 21.

89. Ibid, p 18.

90. Ibid, p 17.

91. Ibid, p 166.

92. Ibid, p 16.

93. Ibid, pp 140, 165–170.

94. On this, see McCrudden, above n 14. See also S Riley ‘Human dignity: comparative and conceptual debates’ (2010) 6(2) Int'l J L C 117.

95. TAOD, above n 3, p 3.

96. See eg ibid, p 17, ch 6.

97. Habermas, for example, considers human rights to be legal specifications of human dignity: see Habermas, above n 52, at 464. In turn, on the specification of rights, see eg R Shafer-Landau ‘Specifying absolute rights’ (1995) 37 Ariz L Rev 209; J Oberdiek ‘Specifying rights out of necessity’ (2008) 28 Oxford J Legal Stud 127.

98. This is only mentioned in passing and by reference to German academic commentary on Article 1 of the Grundgesetz at TAOD, above n 3, p 160. See also D Hollenbach ‘Human dignity: experience and history, practical reason and faith’ in McCrudden, above n 4.

99. See SW v UK; CR v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363.

100. For Dupré, autonomy is a key aspect of human dignity (TAOD, above n 3, pp 33–36) and the rule of law is a key aspect of constitutionalism: ibid, p 141.

101. Ibid, pp 102–103.

102. Ibid, pp 182–193.

103. Ibid, p 170.

104. Ibid, pp 106–107. See also, on autonomy, ibid, pp 33–36.

105. See eg McCrudden, above n 1; and McCrudden, above n 14. On autonomy and paternalism, for instance, see McCrudden, above n 1, at 705–706.

106. TAOD, above n 3, p 40.

107. Ibid, p 43. Dupré also broadly attributes human dignity concerns to the ECHR, although there was no explicit mention of human dignity in it; she does so also in light of Strasbourg case-law alluding to human dignity: see ibid, pp 63–66.

108. M Mahlmann ‘The good sense of dignity: six antidotes to dignity fatigue in ethics and law’ in McCrudden, above n 4,p 595, citing N Chomsky New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p 147.

109. TAOD, above n 3, p 51.

110. Ibid, p 17.

111. See McCrudden, above n 14, at 2 (citations omitted): ‘The familiar story is that when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being drafted in 1948, the participants were able to agree on what they were against, but not on why they were against these violations.’

112. See Mahlmann, above n 108, pp 594–595. On conceptual interpretation, see R Dworkin Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011) ch 8.

113. See TAOD, above n 3, pp 47–50.

114. Ibid, p 21, citing G Kateb Human Dignity (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011) pp 10–17.

115. See eg Kateb, ibid, pp 13, 23. For more on Kateb's Human Dignity, see B Pilkington ‘George Kateb, Human Dignity book review’ (2012) 66(2) Rev Metaphys 369.

116. TAOD, above n 3, ch 2.

117. See eg J Coleman ‘Rules and social facts’ (1991) 14(3) Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 703.

118. See the critical take on this in M Koskenniemi From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2006) ch 1.

119. On interpretive concepts, see Dworkin, above n 112, p 123, ch 8.

120. The idea of a heuristic concept that Dupré puts forward (see TAOD, above n 3, pp 16–18) can accommodate this possibility.

121. Ibid, p 8.

122. McCrudden, above n 1, at 698. On this topic, see the outline of the criticism and response in Barak, above n 4, pp 8–12.

123. See C Douzinas Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (London: Routledge, 2007) pp 8, 196. But see T Beattie ‘The vanishing absolute and the deconsecrated god: a theological reflection on revelation, law and human dignity’ in McCrudden, above n 4.

124. Indeed, Shklar's idea of the ‘dignity of work’ can be seen as potentially compatible with such development – see J Shklar American Citizenship – The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995) p 1, as cited in V Mantouvalou ‘Workers without rights as citizens at the margins’ (2013) 16 Crit Rev Int'l Soc & Pol Phil 366 at 375, in turn cited at TAOD, above n 3, p 136. In light of Dupré's account of human dignity's support for the elderly (see eg ibid, p 154), it is worth citing a European study on welfare, ageism and neoliberalism: M Wilińska and E Cedersund ‘“Classic ageism” or “brutal economy”? Old age and older people in the Polish media’ (2010) 24 J Aging Stud 335.

125. See TAOD, above n 3, pp 58–61, 121–122, 141–142.

126. See Koskenniemi, above n 118. Notably, however, Dupré denounces complacency: see TAOD, above n 3, p 198.

127. Hutchinson v UK (2015) 61 EHRR 13. The case has been referred to the ECtHR's Grand Chamber.

128. TAOD, above n 3, pp 164–165.

129. See eg ibid, p 184.

130. Vinter and others v UK App nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10 (ECtHR, 9 July 2013). See on this N Mavronicola ‘Inhuman and degrading punishment, dignity, and the limits of retribution’ (2014) 77(2) Mod L Rev 292; D Van Zyl Smit, P Weatherby and S Creighton ‘Whole life sentences and the tide of European human rights jurisprudence: what is to be done?’ (2014) 14(1) Hum Rts L Rev 59.

131. Pace the exploits of the EU's FRONTEX agency, for example, outlined in M Fink ‘Frontex working arrangements: legitimacy and human rights concerns regarding technical relationships’ (2012) 28 Utrecht J Int'l & Eur L 20.

132. TAOD, above n 3, ch 7.

133. On this, see G Letsas ‘Strasbourg's interpretive ethic: lessons for the international lawyer’ (2010) 21 Eur J Int’ L 509 at 531.

134. See TAOD, above n 3, p 188.

135. The – perhaps disquieting – allusions to civility and civilisation in TAOD are multiple: see ibid, pp 78, 100, 125, 175, 196.

136. Dupré's aversion to a morally worse future is evident at many points in the book: see eg ibid, pp 148–150.

137. Ibid, p 21, Kateb, above n 114, pp 10–17. See Tasioulas on deploying ‘moral reasoning’: Tasioulas, above n 63, p 293.

138. I juxtapose this with Dupré's suggestion that human dignity has nothing to do with morality. See text to n 114 above.

139. Consider, for instance, Weiler's prophetic ‘Us and Them’ warning prior to the establishment of EU citizenship, in J Weiler ‘The transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100(8) Yale L J 2403 at 2482: ‘The potential corrosive effect on the values of the community vision of European integration are self-evident. Nationality as referent for interpersonal relations, and the human alienating effect of Us and Them are brought back again, simply transferred from their previous intra-Community context to the new intercommunity one. We have made little progress if the Us becomes European (instead of German or French or British) and the Them becomes those outside the Community or those inside who do not enjoy the privileges of citizenship.’

140. See eg Mahlmann, above n 108, p 598; Tasioulas, above n 63, p 305.

141. TAOD, above n 3, p 126.

142. For a nuanced account of the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of citizenship, see Waldron, above n 66.

143. See the critical comment on such a stance in C O'Cinneide ‘A modest proposal: destitution, state responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2008) 5 Eur Hum Rts L Rev 583, p 588.

144. TAOD, above n 3, pp 21–23.

145. Dupré recognises that certain human rights, notably the absolute rights found in the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), protect ‘foreigners’ and other ‘voiceless minorities’ (see ibid, p 186); see also, on asylum-seekers’ protection, ibid, pp 110–111. Yet foreigners do not enjoy the full range of civil and political or socio-economic rights and benefits associated with EU citizenship. On human rights and the ‘other’, see WP Simmons Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

146. See McCrudden, above n 1, at 723.

147. Such a story could broadly pursue integrity – see Dworkin, above n 112, esp chs 1, 4, 6–9. See also R Dworkin Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

148. Although a commonly used phrase, the plea to ‘heed the call’ is also a reference to Bob Dylan's ‘The times they are a-changin” (Columbia Records 1964), in which ‘the times’ could be read as embodying the idea of kairos outlined by Dupré – see TAOD, above n 3, pp 157–160.

149. See F Nietzsche Human, All Too Human, tr R J Hollingdale (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

150. See R Dworkin ‘Objectivity and truth: you'd better believe it’ (1996) 25(2) Phil & Pub Aff 87 at 122, 139.