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‘Intention and recklessness again’ – a response

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Jenny McEwan
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
John Robilliard
Affiliation:
University of Manchester

Extract

The reply of Professor Williams to our article ‘Recklessness: the House of Lords and the criminal law’ is interesting and vigorous. We continue, however, to adhere to our original view, and attempt below to summarise our objections to what appear to be his main arguments on the law. On the moral issue, we do not consider that Professor Williams has answered the arguments for ‘Caldwell - recklessness’ put forward by Duff. We find the Professor's philosophical position somewhat confusing. Why is it acceptable to convict those who fail to appreciate an obvious risk because of ‘blind rage’ or self-iduced intoxication, but not those whose failure to appreciate it arises from total indifference to the well-being of others?

We should like to make the following points in reply to those charges against us which seem the gravest.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1982

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