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Nudging and rectifying: the use of fiscal instruments for regulatory purposes*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Anthony Ogus*
Affiliation:
University of Manchester; University of Maastricht

Abstract

The paper explores two fiscal devices which, while falling short of the ideal which economists have advocated, may induce behavioural change and thus operate effectively as regulatory instruments: the ‘nudging’ tax, which is calculated according to what level of payment is likely to reduce undesired activity; and the ‘rectificatory’ tax, which relates the sum payable to part of the harm caused by the activity. The former has been widely used, and with some success, but there is tension between its regulatory and revenue-raising functions. The latter seems better designed to meet goals of corrective justice than to modify conduct in an economically appropriated way.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1999

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