1. Model Penal Code, Commentary to § 5.01, at 301Google Scholar

2. Whybrow [1951] 35 Cr. App. R. 141, at 147.Google Scholar

3. Criminal Attempts Act 1981 § 1(1)Google Scholar. see Criew, E.'s Commentary [1981] 1 Current Law Statutes AnnotatedGoogle Scholar; Dennis, I. H., The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (1982) Crim. L.R. 5.Google Scholar

4. Although this simplicity is somewhat undermined by § 1 (2)-(3) of the Act. which deals with “impossible attempts.”

5. See Walker & Hayles [1990] 90 Cr. App. R. 266Google Scholar, with Smith, J. C.'s Comment (1990) Crim L.R. 46Google Scholar; Smith, J. C. & Hogan, B., Criminal Law (7th ed., Butterworths, 1992; hereafter Smith & Hogan) 304–5.Google Scholar

6. See Pigg [1982] 2 All E.R. 591Google Scholar; Breckenridge [1984] 79 Cr. App. R. 244Google Scholar; Williams, G., The Problem of Reckless Attempts (1983) Crim. L.R. 365Google Scholar; Buxton, R., Circumstances, Consequences and Attempted Rape (1983) Crim. L.R. 25Google Scholar; Duff, R. A., The Circumstances of an Attempt (1990) Cambridge L.J.100.Google Scholar

7. See. notoriously, Anderton u Ryan [1985] 1 A.C. 560Google Scholar: Williams, G., The Lords and Impossible Attempts, or Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? (1986) 45 Cambridge L. J.33Google Scholar; Stannard, J. E.. Making Up for the Missing Element: A Sideways Look at Attempts (1987) 7 Legal Studies 194Google Scholar; Duff, R. A., Attempts and the Problem of the Missing Circumstance (1991) 42 Northern Ireland L.Q.87.Google Scholar

8. I will not be concerned here with the Code's concern to ensure that impossibility should in general not bar conviction for an attempt, and to extend the scope of the law of attempts by requiring only a substantial step by way of conduct.

9. See supra note 1, at 301–5.

10. For useful critical discussion, see Robinson, P. H. & Grall, J. A., Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: Tiie Model Penal Code and Beyond (1983) 35 Stanford L.R.681, at 744–51Google Scholar: Robinson, P. H., A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law (1994) 88 Northwestern University L.R. 857, at 889–96.Google Scholar

11. See my op. cit., supra note 6, at 104–11.

12. See, for instance, Sexual Offences Act 1956 § 6.

13. supra note l, at 302.

14. See supra note 7; also Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).Google Scholar

15. See Shivpuri [1987] A.C. 1Google Scholar; Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (1976).Google Scholar

16. See supra note 1. at 302, n.12.

17. See supra note 1, at 305; on “practically certain,” see Code § 2.02(2)(b).

18. Robinson favors the latter reading of the Code and criticizes it for that reason; op. cit., supra note 10. at 891, 894–5.

19. see at notes 149–50.

20. Whybrow [1951] 35 Cr. App. R. 141, at 147.Google Scholar

21. Criminal Damage Act 1971 § 1(1)Google Scholar; sww also Model Penal Code § 2203.

22. See supra at notes 3–7.

23. I have argued elsewhere that this account provides neat solutions to the problem of specifying the requisite fault element as to circumstantial aspects of the complete offense (op. cit., supra note 6; also Recklessness in Attempts (Again) (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal StudiesGoogle Scholar; see supra at notes 6, 11–16), and to the problems posed by one kind of impossible attempt (op. cit., supra note 7).

24. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 § 1(1)Google Scholar; see Model Penal Code § 213.1(1) (read in the light of § 2.02(1)); my op. cit., supra at note 6, and Recklessness in Attempts (Again).

25. Theft Act 1968 § 22Google Scholar; see Model Penal Code § 223.6.

26. See my op. cit., supra at note 7.

27. See Smith, & Hogan, , 327–75Google Scholar; Lafave, W. R. & Scott, A. W., Criminal Law (2nd ed., West Publishing Co., 1986; hereafter Lafave & Scott), 605–83Google Scholar; Gordon, G. H., The Criminal Law of Scotland (2nd ed., W. Green 1978; hereafter Gordon), 727–807Google Scholar. I will refer to the most serious species of homicide as “murder” (without distinguishing, as some jurisdictions do, different degrees of murder), and to lesser species of criminal homicide as “manslaughter.”

28. See Lafave, & Scott, 653–65Google Scholar; Smith, & Hogan, 351–65.Google Scholar

29. See Lafave, & Scott, 665–7Google Scholar; Model Penal Code § 3.09 (2).

30. See Smith, & Hogan, 365–75Google Scholar; Lafave, & Scott, 668–75Google Scholar. I ignore “unlawful act” manslaughter here: Smith, & Hogan, 366–72Google Scholar; Lafave, & Scott, 675–81.Google Scholar

31. See Ámeda, , 455 A.2d 1326 (1983, Connecticut)Google Scholar; Brown, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1964, New York)Google Scholar; Gonzales, 532 S.W. 2d 343 (1976, Texas)Google Scholar; Howard, 405 A. 2d 206 (1979. Maine)Google Scholar; Zuptez 322 N.W.2d 730 (1982. Minnesota).Google Scholar

32. Almeda, 455 A.2d 1326, 1329Google Scholar; see also Gonzales, 532 S.W.2d 343Google Scholar; Zuptez, 322 N.W.2d 730Google Scholar; and Hembd, 643 P.2d 567 (1982, Montana: impossibility of attempted misdemeanor arson).Google Scholar

33. See Sexual Offences Act 1956 § 6Google Scholar; Model Penal Code § 213.3.

34. Law Commission No.177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales; Vol. 1. Draft Criminal Code Bill (H.M.S.O., 1989)Google Scholar. See also Model Penal Code § 211.1.

35. Compare the confusion into which the trial judge fell in Millard and Vernon [1987] Crim. L.R. 393Google Scholar, when the charge was that the defendants “attempted to damage a wooden wall… intending to damage [it] or being reckless as to whether [it] would be damaged”; see also Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1992) [1994] 1 W.L.R.409. at 416.Google Scholar

36. Theft Act 1968 § 1 (1).Google Scholar

37. So too. theft in the Model Penal Code requires an unlawful taking, or exercising of control, or transfer, of property (§ 223.2); but we cannot sensibly say that attempted theft should require an intention that my taking be unlawful. The 1989 Draft Code (supra note 34) deals with this problem by defining “an intention to commit an offence” as “an intention with respect to all the elements of the offence other than fault elements”; § 49(2). But quite apart from the question of whether intention should be required as to all non-fault elements of the offense (see text at notes 6, 11–16), there is the difficulty of distinguishing the definitional elements of an offense from the defenses that may be available to someone whose conduct satisfies those definitional elements (see Law Commission No.177 (supra note 34) vol.II, Commentary, II 7. 1–3; Campbell, K., Offence and Defence in Dennis, I. H. (ed.), Criminal Law and Justice at 73–86 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1987)Google Scholar: for the agent surely need not act with intent as to the absence of a defence (see § III below).

38. See Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 § 1(1).Google Scholar

39. See supra at note 24.

40. See Brown, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1964, New York)Google Scholar; Carter, 170 N.W.2d 681 (1969. Wisconsin)Google Scholar; Melvin, 181 N.W.2d 490 (1970. Wisconsin)Google Scholar; Genes, 227 N.W.2d 241 (1975, Michigan)Google Scholar; Howard, 405 A.2d 206 (1979. Maine)Google Scholar; Rhode, 391 N.E.2d 666 (1979. Indiana).Google Scholar

41. Criminal Damage Act 1971 § 1(1)Google Scholar; see Model Penal Code § 220.3.

42. See Norman, 580 P. 2d 237 (1978. Utah).Google Scholar

43. Compare the Wisconsin Code's definition of attempt: The agent must “have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime” (§ 939,32(2)). One could also read the Model Penal Code's definition in this way: What matters is whether the agent intends to do something (to engage in conduct, to cause a result) that would constitute the commission of the complete crime if she succeeded in doing it (but see supra at notes 10–19).

44. See Hyam [1975] A.C. 55Google Scholar: Ms. Hyam set fire to Ms. Booth's house, knowing that Ms. Booth and her daughters were in the house, in order to frighten her into leaving town. Lord Hailsham argued that her intention to expose others “to a serious risk of death or grievous bodily harm” (at 77) sufficed to convict her of the murder of the daughters who were killed by the fire. Whatever the merits of that account of the fault element in murder (see my Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Blackwell 1990) Ch. 7.6Google Scholar), the account of attempts argued for here would certainly have acquitted her of attempted murder had no one died; see further below § IV.

45. Contrast Judge Crockett's dissenting judgment in Norman. There could be a criminal attempt to “recklessly cause the death of another,” he argued, if “reckless conduct is intentionally directed toward a person … in such a manner as death would be a natural consequence, but that consequence does not result because of some fortuitous circumstance,” for the agent “has attempted to do everything required to constitute that crime” (580 P.2d 237, 240). But the agent does not attempt to do everything required to constitute the crime of reckless homicide, for that crime involves causing death, and he does not attempt to cause death. See further below § IV.

46. Op. cit., supra note 10. 890–6.

47. Id. at 893.

48. Id. at 891; see supra at notes 17–19.

49. The same result follows from the Model Penal Code's provisions (see supra note 8): Someone who does not intend (or confidently expect) to cause death does not satisfy the requirements of § 5.0(1), while someone who does intend to cause death would be guilty of attempted murder, or attempted voluntary, not involuntary, manslaughter.

50. See Gordon, , 837–10Google Scholar on “causing danger to the lieges by culpable recklessness”; and Model Penal Code § 211.2 for “recklessly engaging in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” But reckless endangerment is only a misdemeanor, whereas manslaughter is (and attempted manslaughter would therefore also be) a felony (see §§ 210.3(2), 5.05(1)).

51. see Smith, K. J. M., Liability for Endangerment: English Ad Hoc Progmatism and American Innovation (1983) Crim. L.R. 127.Google Scholar

52. See text at notes 28–29 supra.

53. A referee asked what the result would be. according to this test, if an agent forms an unprovoked intention to kill, but is then provoked into actually trying to kill. Unless he actually intends [to be provoked] (i.e., to cause the victim to provoke him), this would still be attempted voluntary manslaughter, not attempted murder what matters is the content and the context of the intention with which the agent actually acts.

54. 17 So. 2d 260 (1944); see the commentary to art.27 of die 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code.

55. 368N.E.2d 1204 (1977, Massachusetts) at 1206;quoting Demboski, 186N.E.589 (1933)Google Scholar, on assault with intent to commit manslaughter But, the court held, there was no room for this offense in Massachusetts law, since it was not distinct from assault with intent to kill.

56. For other less clearly argued decisions to the same effect, see Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (1978. Utah)Google Scholar; Taylor, 444 So. 2d 931 (1983. Florida)Google Scholar; also Butman, 42 N.H.490 (1861. New Hampshire)Google Scholar. Dean, 83 So. 504 (1919. Florida)Google Scholar, Crutcher, 1 N.2d 195 (1941, Iowa)Google Scholar, on assault with intent to commit manslaughter.

57. 230 N.E.2d 12 (1967. Illinois).

58. Ill. Rev. Stat (1965) § 9–2(a).Google Scholar

59. Id., § 8–4(a).

60. 230 N.E.2d 12, at 14.

61. See Lilley, 5 N.W.982 (1880, Michigan)Google Scholar. Moore, 35 N.E.166 (1893, Illinois)Google Scholar for similar decisions on assault with intent to commit manslaughter. For criticism, see Quirico, Judge in Hebert, 368 N.E.2d (1977, Massachusetts) 1204, 1208–9Google Scholar; Sachs, J., Is Attempt to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter a Possible Crime? (1982) 71 Illinois Bar Journal 166Google Scholar. In Scotland, Brady held that provocation that would reduce murder to culpable homicide reduces attempted murder not to attempted culpable homicide, but to “assault to severe injury under provocation” [1986] S.L.T.686, 688. The only argument given is that “killing under provocation is not deliberate,” implying that only someone who does not intend to kill could plead provocation; but that is not the law (see Gordon, , 766, 770–1Google Scholar). In England, , Bruzas [1972] Crim. L.R. 367Google Scholar held that provocation that would reduce murder to manslaughter cannot reduce attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. This might be justified by arguing that provocation is needed as a formal (partial) defense only for murder (given the fixed sentence for murder), and in other contexts should figure simply as a mitigating factor in sentencing; see English, P., Provocation and Attempted Murder (1973) Crim L.R. 727Google Scholar. The Criminal Law Revision Committee has proposed that the law should recognize attempted manslaughter on grounds of provocation or diminished responsibility, as well as attempted infanticide (see Offences Against the Person, H.M.S.O. 1980, II 98, 113Google Scholar. A woman commits infanticide if she kills her child, of less than a year old, while the balance of her mind is disturbed by the after-effects of childbirth; Infanticide Act, 1938 § 1Google Scholar. A plea of attempted infanticide was accepted in Smith [1983] Crim. L.R. 739).Google Scholar

62. 457 N.E.2d 1260 (1983, Illinois).

63. ILL. Rev Stat. 1979 §§ 8–4 (a), 9–2 (b).Google Scholar

64. 457 N.E.2d 1260, 1261–2.

65. As the prosecution argued here, 457 N.E.2d 1260. 1261.

66. 418 A. 2d 154 (1980, Maine): see Poliquin, B. L., State v. Grant Is Intent an Essential Element of Criminal Attempts in Mainel (1982) 34 Maine L.R. 479.Google Scholar

67. Maine, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152. 204–5.Google Scholar

68. 418A. 2d 154. 156.

69. See 17-A M. R. S. A. § 204(1)(A); note that his recklessness concerns not the risk of causing death, but the existence of circumstances that would justify his killing.

70. Grant might be justified by a narrower, statutory argument. One who acts in imperfect self-defense can be convicted “only of a crime for which recklessness or criminal negligence sufficcs” (17-A M.R.SA. § 101); but recklessness and criminal negligence cannot suffice for attempted homicide, which requires an intention to kill. My concern here, however, is with the argument that attempted fourth- or fifth-degrce homicide is “logically impossible.”

71. This is a version of an objection pul to me by a referee.

72. See at notes 24. 38–39 supra.

73. On such doctrines of implied malice, see Smith, & Hogan, , 327–9Google Scholar; Draft Code § 54 (1)Google Scholar; Lafave, & Scott, , 616–7Google Scholar; Gordon, . 732–48Google Scholar; Canadian Criminal Code § 229.Google Scholar The Model Penal Code does not contain any such doctrine, but does allow for extreme indifference murder; see § 210.2(l)(b).

74. This doctrine of “constructive malice” has been abolished in English law (see Homicide Act 1957 § 1)Google Scholar but survives elsewhere; see Lafave, & Scott, , 622–36Google Scholar; Model Penal Code § 210.2(1) (b); Canadian Criminal Code § 230.Google Scholar

75. See, e.g., Whybrow [1951] 35 Cr. App. R. 141Google Scholar; Thacker, 114 S.E.504 (1922, Virginia)Google Scholar; Butler, 322 So. 2d 189 (1975. Louisiana)Google Scholar: Visir, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975, Illinois)Google Scholar; Head, 443 N.E.2d 44 (1982, Indiana)Google Scholar; Brown, 479 A.2d 1317 (1984, Maine)Google Scholar; Flanagan. 675 S.W.2d 734 (1984, Texas).Google Scholar

76. Whybrow [1951] 35 Cr. App. R. 141. 147.Google Scholar

77. See supra at pp. 224.228.

78. [1968] J.C.32: see Gordon, G. H., Cawthorne, and the Mens Rea of Murder (1969)Google ScholarScottish Law Times (News) 41Google Scholar; and Gordon, 263–7.Google Scholar Scottish lawyers have been unhappy with the Cawthorne doctrine (see Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum No.61 1984Google Scholar, Attempted Homicide), but it is still apparently the law; see Brady [19861 S.L.T.686, 688Google Scholar (“it is well settled that the same mens rea is required for attempted murder as for murder”).

79. Macdonald On The Criminal Law of Scotland (5th ed.) 89, as quoted at [1968] J.C. 32, 38 (see Gordon 738).Google Scholar

80. [1968] J.C.32, 37–8 (Lord Guthrie), 38–9 (Lord Cameron).

81. Alison On Criminal Law Vol. i, 163Google Scholar; quoted by Guthrie, Lord at [1968] J.C.32, 38.Google Scholar

82. [1968] J.C.32, 36 (Lord Clyde).

83. See Alison On Criminal Law Vol. i, 163Google Scholar; quoted by Clyde, Lord [1968] J.C.32, 36Google Scholar, and by Guthrie, Lord [1968] J.C.32, 38.Google Scholar

84. See [1968] J.C.32, 38 (Lord Cameron).

85. [1968] J.C.32, 39 (Lord Cameron). Compare Clyde, Lord at 36: “the one vital distinction”Google Scholar between attempted murder and murder is that “the killing has not been brought off.”

86. 374 So. 2d 954 (1979); followed in Amlotte, 456 So. 2d 448 (1984).Google Scholar

87. 374 So. 2d 954, 956.

88. Other courts rejected this view, partly from dislike of the felony murder rule. See e. g., Viser, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975. Illinois)Google Scholar; Head. 443 N.E.2d 44 (1982, Indiana)Google Scholar; Judges Overton and McDonald dissenting in Amlolte, 456 So. 2d 448 (1984).Google ScholarSee also Flanagan, 675 S.W.2d 675 734 (1984, Texas)Google Scholar: the intention to cause serious injury, though sufficient for murder, does not suffice for attempted murder.

89. 422 So. 2d 1072 (1982. District Court of Appeal); affirmed by Supreme Court, 437 So. 2d 1097 (1983).Google ScholarSee Lords, L. B., Criminal Law: Requiring the Same Intent for Prosecution of Criminal Attempts and the Consummated Crime (1984) 36 University of Florida L.R. 545.Google Scholar

90. Fla.Stat. (1977) § 782. 04(2).Google Scholar

91. 422 So. 2d 1072.1073.

92. 437 So. 2d 1097, 1099.

93. Contrast Littles, 384 So. 2d 744 (1980Google Scholar, Florida, First District Court of Appeal): Since attempts require a “specific intent to commit the crime.” attempted second-degree murder requires an “intent to cause the death of a human being, but without premeditation.”

94. Fla. Stat. (1981) § 777. 04(1).Google Scholar

95. 657 P.2d 932 (1983).

96. C.R.S. 1973 § 18–3–102(I)(d)Google Scholar; see Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b).

97. See C.R.S. 1973 § 18–2–101 (I)Google Scholar; compare Model Penal Code § 5.01 (1)(c).

98. C.R.S. 1973 s.18–2–101 (compare Model Penal Code § 5.01(2), requiring only conduct that is “strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose”). The Court cited this definition (at 937), but ignored its implications.

99. Compare I Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed.) 522Google Scholar, quoted in Merritt, 180 S.E.395 (1935, Virginia) 399Google Scholar: “To commit murder, one need not intend to take life; but to be guilty of an attempt to murder, he must so intend. It is not sufficient that his act, had it proved fatal, would have been murder.”

100. Robinson, , op. cit., supra, note 10, at 893.Google Scholar

101. See supra notes 46–48.

102. Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985) § 24(1). The cases to be discussed here were covered by earlier versions of the Code, but where the relevant provisions were the same, I will refer to the section numbers of the present Code.

103. [1923] 3 D.L.R. 689.

104. R.S.C. 1906 § 264; See Offences Against the Person Act 1861 §§ 11–15.

105. [1923] 3 D.L.R. 689, 690–1. See also Tousignant [1960] 130 C.C.C. 285 (Quebec Court of Appeal) 285, 287 (“there can be no attempt to murder without an attempt to kill”)Google Scholar; Owens [1970] 2 C.C.C. 38 (British Columbia Court of Appeal)Google Scholar. But in Walker [1964] 2 C.C.C. 217Google Scholar, two members of the Quebec Court of Appeal assumed without argument that one who would have committed murder under § 230, had his shot killed, could be convicted of attempted murder (Tremblay, C. J. at 219Google Scholar, Rivard, J. at 235Google Scholar (contrast Rinfret, J. dissent at 220–3).Google Scholar

106. [1970] 5 C.C.C. 336.

107. [1970] C.C.C. 336, 342–3.

108. See also Ross [1975] C.C.C.2d 545. 549.Google Scholar

109. [1973] 33 D.L.R.3d 618; following Trinneer [1970] 10 D.L.R.3d 568Google Scholar. a case of accomplice liability for murder; see Burns, P. & Reid, R., From Felony Murder to Accomplice Felony Attempted Murder (1977) 55 Canadian Bar Review 75.Google Scholar

110. [1973] D.L.R.3d 618, 622, quoting from Nemetz. J. A. in the British Columbia Court of Appeal's judgment

111. [1973] 33 D.L.R. 3d 618, 623–4.

112. This doctrine was followed by courts in Scotia, Nova (Comeau [1973] 14 C.C.C.2d 472)Google Scholar and British Columbia (Sarginson [1976] 37 C.C.C.2d 492Google Scholar; Berry [1978] 37 C.C.C.2d 559)Google Scholar. But in Sarginson, although Rae J. felt reluctantly bound to apply this doctrine, he argued forcefully that it should be reconsidered; see at notes 114, 120. See also the Australian cases of Newman [1948] V.L.R.61Google Scholar (D guilty of wounding “with intent to murder,” if he would have committed murder had his victim died; overruled in Spartels [1953] V.L.R. 194)Google Scholar, and Zerafa [1953] St. R. Qd. 227Google Scholar (an intention to cause grievous bodily harm might suffice for “unlawfully attempting to kill”).

113. See text at notes 43–5 supra (also at notes 46–8, 100–1 on conduct “which constitutes the commission of the offense of murder”).This was why the Supreme Court overruled Lajole in Ancio [1984] 6 D.L.R.4th 577Google Scholar, and rejected the prosecution's argument, drawn from Lajoie, that the intent required for attempted murder is simply an “intent to do that which will, if death is caused, constitute the commission of murder as defined in [§§ 229 and 230] of the Code” [at 594]; see at note 124.

114. See, e.g., Viser. 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975), 911Google Scholar; and Rae, J. comments in Sarpnson [1976] 31 C.C.C. 2d 492, 494–5.Google Scholar

115. Criminal Attempts Act 1981 § 1(1).

116. Model Penal Code § 5.01 (1) (c).

117. Canadian Criminal Code § 24 (2).

118. see Smith, & Hogan, , 347.Google Scholar

119. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1) (b).

120. Canadian Code § 230(a), (d); and Rae, J. remarks in Sarginson [1976] 31 C.C.C. 2d 492, 494–5.Google Scholar

121. These results would require special interpretations of references to “the offense” or “the crime” in standard definitions of attempts (“a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime”; “more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence”; not “too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence”). They must be taken to refer to the action that would constitute the commission of the offense (murder) ifit caused death. See supra at notes 46–8, 100–1.

122. See McIntyre, J. comments in Ancio [1984] 6 D.L.R. 4th 577, 596.Google Scholar

123. See Goff, Lord, The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder (1988) 104 Law Q.R. 30Google Scholar; Williams, G.The Mens Rea for Murder: Leave it Alone (1989) 105 Law Q.R. 387Google Scholar; Ashworth, A. J., Reforming the Law of Murder (1990) Crim L. R. 75Google Scholar; and my op. cit. note 44 supra, Ch. 7.4, 7.6.

124. [1984] 6 D.L.R.4th 577. 594 (McIntyre J., speaking for the majority); see note 113 supra.

125. See note 23 Supra.

126. Although if the difference between murder and attempted murder is so fortuitous, we must ask why the law should distinguish complete from attempted crimes at all. This is not an issue I can pursue here, but see at notes 141–3.

127. See. e.g., Gentry 437Google Scholar So. 2d 1097 [1982], 1099; at notes 89–93 supra.

128. See text at notes 50–1 supra.

129. See Cawthorne [1968] J.C. 32, 36Google Scholar; at notes 79–86 supra.

130. Model Penal Code § 5.01 (1).

131. See Scottish Law Commission, Attempted Homicide (supra note 78)Google Scholar. It may appear paradoxical to acquit of attempted murder someone who would have been guilty of murder had death ensued, but only “if one seeks to determine the nature of an attempt by reference to the character of a completed crime; it is not [paradoxical] if one concentrates on the concept of the attempt by itself” (29). Also Smith & Hogan: “The mens rea of the complete crime should be modified only in so far as it is necessary in order to accommodate the concept of attempt” (305–6).

132. Ashworth, A. J., Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm (1988) 19 Rutgers L.J. 725. 756.Google Scholar

133. See note 121 supra.

134. On complete and incomplete attempts, see Ashworth, , op. cit., note 132 supra, 734.Google Scholar

135. The definitions of attempted murder discussed in § IV, as not requiring an intention to kill, were of this form: Did the agent act with an intention such that he would have committed murder had he caused death? And compare Robinson's account of a “purpose to engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense”; at notes 46–8, 100–1 supra.

136. Two who do take this possibility seriously are D. Stuart and A. J. Ashworth. But Stuart has resiled from his earlier support for it Rea, Mens, Negligence and Attempts (1968) Crim. L.R. 647Google Scholar; Canadian Criminal Law (Carswell. 1982), 524–9Google Scholar. Ashworth also rejects it, though it is favored by the “basic principles of culpability and of equality of treatment.” op. cit., note 132 supra, 757; Defining Criminal Offences without Harm in Smith, P. (ed.), Criminal Law, Essays in Honour of J. C. Smith (Butterworths 1987) 7, 18–19Google Scholar. See also Smith, J. C., The Element of Chance in Criminal Liability (1971) Crim L.R. 63.Google Scholar

137. See at note 114 supra.

138. See my Choice, Character and Criminal Liability (1993) 12 Law And Philosophy 345Google Scholar; also Horder, J., Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory (1993) 12 Law And Philosophy 193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

139. See my op. cit., note 44 supra Ch. 8.

140. Such an account might seem to beg the question against criminal liability for omissions. I cannot discuss this issue here, but suggest that liability for omissions must still be based on something like action-ascriptions; we must be able to say of the agent not merely that he did not prevent some harm, but that he failed to do something that he ought to have done, or let happen something that he ought to have prevented. A further issue concerns the role of defenses as distinct from the definitional elements of a crime (see note 37 supra). In so far as such a distinction can (or should) be drawn, we may see it as a distinction between the action that must be attributed to the defendant if she is to be convicted, and the further excuses or justifications that might remove or mitigate her culpability for having committed such a (grima facie) criminal action.

141. See, e.g., Ashworth, A. J., Belief, intent and Criminal Liability in Eckelaar, J. & Bell, J. (eds.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Third Series (1987) IGoogle Scholar, on the “belief” and “intent” principles.

142. More precisely, on this view the law should draw no distinction between complete offenses and inchoate versions of them that satisfy a “last act” test, between complete offenses and completed attempts; see at note 134 supra. Subjectivists might (although I cannot pursue this point here) see good reason to distinguish between, on the one hand, completed attempts whether successful or not, and incomplete attempts in which there was still more for the agent to do.

143. For some suggested reasons (although I am not sure that they are persuasive) see Ashworth. Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm (note 132 supra), 770Google Scholar; Defining Criminal Offences Without Harm (note 136 supra).Google Scholar

144. With the sole addition that, in incomplete attempts, the agent must intend to commit some action that would convict him of the complete offense if it caused the relevant result; see at notes 133–5 supra.

145. See op. cit., note 44 supra, Chs. 7–8; Auctions, Latteries, and the Punishment of Attempts (1990) 9 Law and Philosophy 1Google Scholar; Acting, Trying and Criminal Liability, in S. Shute, J. Gardner, and J. Horder (eds.), Action and Value is Criminal Law (1993) 75.Google Scholar

146. See my Recklessness in Attempts (Again), § 6.

147. See at notes 44. 73–4, 123 supra.

148. See at notes 50–1 supra. Actions which are potentially, but not essentially, murderous will already be criminal—for instance, as actual or attempted woundings.

149. See at notes 5, 17–19 supra.

150. See my op. cit, note 44 supra, 204–5.

151. A referee objected that my discussion of “essentially,” as against “potentially,” murderous or homicidal actions does not provide any independent support for my account of the fault element in attempts; it merely restates that account. I admit that it provides no independent support, but I think that it helps to illuminate, and thus I hope to render more persuasive, the character of that account and the conception of action by which it is structured.