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Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2009

Brian Bix
Affiliation:
Quinnipiac College School of Law

Extract

Conceptual analysis is an integral part of legal theory, but the nature and purpose of such inquiries are often not clearly stated. In this article, I attempt to elaborate upon some of the differing reasons for conceptual analysis and what consequences may follow from choosing one objective rather than another. By showing that divergent purposes are often present in competing analyses of the same concept, I also hope to indicate why some “debates” in the jurisprudential literature are best understood as theorists talking past one another.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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