Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T18:15:31.351Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

LAW IS NECESSARILY VAGUE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2002

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

In fact, law is necessarily very vague. So if vagueness is a problem for legal theory, it is a serious problem. The problem has to do with the ideal of the rule of law and with the very idea of law: if vague standards provide no guidance in some cases, how can the life of a community be ruled by law? The problem has long concerned philosophers of law; the papers at this symposium address it afresh by asking what legal theory may have to learn from (or contribute to) work on vagueness in philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. Here I will not try to state the implications of vagueness for philosophy of law; I will try to set the stage by showing that vagueness is both an important and an unavoidable feature of law.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press