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Legal Conventionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2009

Andrei Marmor
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University

Extract

There are two questions I would like to address in this article. The first and main question is whether there are rules of recognition, along the lines suggested by H.L.A. Hart. The second question concerns the age-old issue of the autonomy of law. One of the main purposes of this article is to show how these two issues are closely related. The concept of a social convention is the thread holding these two points tightly knit in one coil. Basically, I will argue that a novel account of social conventions can be employed to reestablish Hart's thesis about the rules of recognition, and that this same account shows why, and to what extent, law is partly an autonomous practice.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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