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ENDOGENOUS RECOMBINANT GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 September 2017

Carla Marchese,
Simone Marsiglio,
Fabio Privileggi and
Giovanni B. Ramello
Carla Marchese
Affiliation:
Università del Piemonte Orientale
Simone Marsiglio*
Affiliation:
University of Wollongong
Fabio Privileggi
Affiliation:
Università di Torino
Giovanni B. Ramello
Affiliation:
Università del Piemonte Orientale
*
Address correspondence to: Simone Marsiglio, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia; e-mail: simonem@uow.edu.au.
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Abstract

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We show that, even in a framework in which monopolistic exploitation of patents does not occur, patents still give rise to serious drawbacks. We rely on a recombinant growth framework that provides a stylized but clear description of the formation of knowledge externalities. In our setting a benevolent government buys immediately new patents in a competitive market and releases their contents for free. We show that inefficiencies nevertheless arise and welfare can be improved by correcting the market price through a tax–subsidy scheme. We characterize the (asymptotic) steady-state equilibrium, and some properties of the transitional path. We show that if certain conditions are met, then the economy will converge to its (asymptotic) balanced growth path, and along such a pathgrowth will be independent of the policy parameter; conversely, transition dynamics are affected by the choice of the policy parameter. We then quantitatively analyze the effect of different policy interventions on welfare, and show that stricter tax (weaker appropriability) regimes lead to higher social welfare.

Keywords

Endogenous Recombinant GrowthIntellectual Property RightsKnowledge ProductionWelfare

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Macroeconomic Dynamics , Volume 23 , Issue 5 , July 2019, pp. 2035 - 2067
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Footnotes

We are indebted to two anonymous referees for their constructive feedback that pushed us to rethink the model, clarifying its assumptions and results. We also wish to thank R. Boucekkine, A. Bucci, C. Garcia Peñalosa, and the participants in the 12th Journées Louis-André Gérerd-Varet Conference in Public Economics (Aix-En-Provence, France, June 2013) for insightful and constructive discussion. All remaining errors and omissions are our own sole responsibility. Carla Marchese and Giovanni B. Ramello acknowledge the financial support from Università del Piemonte Orientale.

References

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