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FINANCIAL REGULATION AND ENDOGENOUS MACROECONOMIC CRISES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 August 2017

Luca Riccetti
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Macerata
Alberto Russo*
Affiliation:
Università Politecnica delle Marche
Mauro Gallegati
Affiliation:
Università Politecnica delle Marche
*
Address correspondence to: Alberto Russo, Department of Management, Università Politecnica delle Marche, Piazzale Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona (Italy); e-mail: alberto.russo@univpm.it.
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Abstract

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We explore the effects of banking regulation on financial stability and macroeconomic dynamics in an agent-based computational model. In particular, we study the minimum level of capital and the lending concentration towards a single counterpart. We show that an overly tight regulation is dangerous because it reduces credit availability. By contrast, overly loose constraints, associated with a high payout ratio, increase financial fragility that, in turn, damage the real economy. Simulation results support the introduction of regulatory rules aimed at assuring an adequate capitalization of banks, such as the Capital Conservation Buffer (Basel III reform).

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017