Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T07:50:03.018Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A NOTE ON THE UNEMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY PUZZLE: IS CREDIBLE WAGE BARGAINING THE ANSWER?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2020

Bingsong Wang*
Affiliation:
The University of Warwick
*
Address correspondence to: Bingsong Wang, Department of Economics, The University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. e-mail: b.wang.9@warwick.ac.uk.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

This paper shows that the ability of the credible wage bargaining model to match the observed unemployment volatility hinges on an unrealistic assumption about disagreement payoffs to the firm. Relaxing this assumption can lead to the substantial wage flexibility. As a consequence, the model is unable to capture the observed unemployment volatility.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2020