Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2rsb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-12T09:07:50.694Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A NOTE ON THE UNIQUENESS OF STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER STATE-DEPENDENT WAGE SETTING

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2020

Shuhei Takahashi*
Affiliation:
Kyoto University, CIGS
*
Address correspondence to: Shuhei Takahashi, Institute of Economic Research, KyotoUniversity, Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. e-mail: takahashi@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp. Phone: +81-75-753-7153
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Does wage setting exhibit strategic complementarity and produce multiple equilibria? This study constructs a discrete-time New Keynesian model in which households choose the timing of their wage adjustments endogenously subject to fixed wage-setting costs. I explore steady-state equilibrium of the state-dependent wage-setting model both analytically and numerically. For reasonable parameter values, complementarity in wage setting is weak and the steady-state equilibrium is unique.

Information

Type
Note
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2020
Supplementary material: File

Takahashi supplementary material

Takahashi supplementary material

Download Takahashi supplementary material(File)
File 88.9 KB