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ONE EMU FISCAL POLICY FOR THE EURO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2019

Alexandre Lucas Cole
Affiliation:
PBO (UPB) and LUISS Guido Carli
Chiara Guerello*
Affiliation:
LUISS Guido Carli
Guido Traficante
Affiliation:
European University of Rome
*
Address correspondence to: Chiara Guerello, LUISS Guido Carli, viale Romania 32, 00197 Rome, Italy; e-mail: cguerello@luiss.it. Phone: (+39)3475505426.
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Abstract

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We build a two-country New-Keynesian DSGE model of a Currency Union to study the effects of fiscal policy coordination, by evaluating the stabilization properties and welfare implications of different fiscal policy scenarios. Our main findings are that a government spending rule which targets the net exports gap rather than the domestic output gap produces more stable dynamics and that consolidating government budget constraints across countries with symmetric tax rate movements provides greater stabilization. A key role is played by the trade elasticity which determines the impact of the terms of trade on net exports. In fact, when goods are complements, the stabilization properties of coordinating fiscal policies are no longer supported. These findings point out to possible policy prescriptions for the Euro Area: to coordinate fiscal policies by reducing international demand imbalances, either by stabilizing trade flows across countries or by creating some form of Fiscal Union or both.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
© 2019 Cambridge University Press
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Cole et al. supplementary material

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