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OPTIMAL PAY-AS-YOU-GO SOCIAL SECURITY WITH ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2017

Koichi Miyazaki*
Affiliation:
Kagawa University
*
Address correspondence to: Koichi Miyazaki, Faculty of Economics, Kagawa University, 2-1, Saiwaicho, Takamatsu, Kagawa 7608523, Japan; e-mail: kmiyazaki@ec.kagawa-u.ac.jp.
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Abstract

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This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, this paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first-best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner distributes resources and forces an old agent to work and retire as she wants. The second-best allocation is one that maximizes welfare when a social planner can use only pay-as-you-go social security in a decentralized economy. This paper finds a range of an old agent's labor productivity such that the first-best allocation is achieved in a decentralized economy. This finding differs from that in Michel and Pestieau [“Social security and early retirement in an overlapping-generations growth model”, Annals of Economics & Finance, 2013], which notes that the first-best allocation cannot be achieved in a decentralized economy.

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017