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OVERCOMING FINANCIAL FRICTIONS WITH THE FRIEDMAN RULE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2017

Sergio Salas*
Affiliation:
Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaiso
*
Address correspondence to: Sergio Salas, Escuela de Economía y Negocios, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Av. Brasil 2830, Piso 9. Valparaíso, Chile; e-mail: sergiosalaslan@gmail.com.
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Abstract

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A general equilibrium model with financial frictions in which individuals may encounter unobservable investment opportunities is developed along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). I study efficiency properties induced by money and monetary policy when financial frictions prevent optimal equilibrium allocations. By providing closed-form solutions to all prices, allocations, welfare, and, especially, the distribution of individuals with respect to assets, I show that the Friedman rule achieves maximal social welfare, independent of how tight the financial constraints may be. The same level of welfare would be induced by an omniscient central planner able to verify who has an investment opportunity.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017