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PATENT LENGTH AND PRICE REGULATION IN AN R&D GROWTH MODEL WITH MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2013

Jinli Zeng*
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore
Jie Zhang
Affiliation:
Chongqing University and National University of Singapore
Michael Ka-Yiu Fung
Affiliation:
Chinese University of Hong Kong
*
Address correspondence to: Jinli Zeng, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore117570; e-mail: ecszjl@nus.edu.sg.
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Abstract

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This paper considers the effects of patent length and price regulation in an R&D growth model with variety expansion. Innovation requires lower bounds on patent length and price. Increasing patent duration promotes growth; increasing the cap on the price of patented products promotes growth below the monopoly-pricing level. Each policy instrument can raise welfare unless excessively used, and their welfare ranking depends on parameterizations. It is desirable, on welfare grounds, to limit patent protection along both dimensions, namely by limiting patent length and capping the price of patented products. Such limits raise welfare despite reducing the growth rate.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013