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POLICY GAMES, DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS, AND THE OPTIMAL INFLATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2014

Alice Albonico*
Affiliation:
University of Milan Bicocca
Lorenza Rossi
Affiliation:
University of Pavia
*
Address correspondence to: Alice Albonico, Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milan, Italy; e-mail: alice.albonico@unimib.it.
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Abstract

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This paper shows that limited asset-market participation (LAMP) generates an extra inflation bias when the fiscal and the monetary authority play strategically. A fully redistributive fiscal policy eliminates the extra inflation bias, but at the cost of reducing Ricardians' welfare. A fiscal authority that redistributes income only partially reduces the inflation bias, but raises government spending. Although a fully conservative monetary policy is necessary to get price stability, it implies a reduction in liquidity-constrained consumers' welfare, in the absence of redistributive fiscal policies. Finally, under a crisis scenario, none of the policy regimes is able to avoid the fall in economic activity when the increase in the fraction of LAMP is coupled with a negative technology shock, whereas optimal policy can avoid recession when it responds to the increase in LAMP proportion alone.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014