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PRODUCTIVITY GAPS AND TAX POLICIES UNDER ASYMMETRIC TRADE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2016

Lucas Bretschger
Affiliation:
Center of Economic Research, ETH Zürich
Simone Valente*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of East Anglia
*
Address correspondence to: Simone Valente, School of Economics, ARTS 3.50, University of East Anglia, NR4 7TJ Norwich, UK; e-mail: s.valente@uea.ac.uk.
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Abstract

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We build a two-country model of endogenous growth to study the welfare effects of taxes on tradable primary inputs when countries engage in asymmetric trade. We obtain explicit links between persistent gaps in productivity growth and the incentives of resource-exporting (importing) countries to subsidize (tax) domestic resource use. The exporters' incentive to subsidize hinges on slower productivity growth and is disconnected from the importers' incentive to tax resource inflows—i.e., rent extraction. Moreover, faster productivity growth exacerbates the importers' incentive to tax, beyond the rent-extraction motive. In a strategic tax game, the only equilibrium is of Stackelberg type and features, for a wide range of parameter values, positive exporters' subsidies and positive importers' taxes at the same time.

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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 
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