Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T02:14:44.539Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

RATIONAL VS. LONG-RUN FORECASTERS: OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE ROLE OF INEQUALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 August 2017

Elton Beqiraj
Affiliation:
Sapienza University of Rome
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo*
Affiliation:
Sapienza University of Rome
Carolina Serpieri
Affiliation:
Sapienza University of Rome
*
Address correspondence to: Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Dipartimento di Economia e Diritto, Sapienza Università di Roma, via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Rome, Italy; e-mail: giovanni.dibartolomeo@uniroma1.it.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

This paper builds a stylized simple sticky-price New Keynesian model where agents' beliefs are not homogeneous. We assume that agents choose optimal plans while considering forecasts of macroeconomic conditions over an infinite horizon. A fraction of them (boundedly rational agents) use heuristics to forecast macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon. In our framework, we study optimal policies consistent with a second-order approximation of the policy objective from the consumers' utility function, assuming that the steady state is not distorted.