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RISK SHOCKS, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND INVESTMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2019

Jonathan Goldberg*
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Board
*
Address correspondence to: Jonathan Goldberg, Federal Reserve Board, Mailstop K1-164, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551, USA. e-mail: jonathan.goldberg@frb.gov.
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Abstract

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This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of shocks to idiosyncratic business risk in an economy with endogenously incomplete markets. I develop a model in which firms face idiosyncratic risk and obtain insurance from intermediaries through contracts akin to credit lines. Insurance is imperfect due to limited commitment in financial contracts. Although steady-state capital is higher than if firms were constrained to issue only standard equity, a rise in uncertainty about idiosyncratic business outcomes leads to an endogenous reduction in risk sharing. This deterioration in risk sharing results from a general-equilibrium shortage of pledgeable assets and implies that the economy’s response to an increase in idiosyncratic business risk can be amplified by financial contracting rather than dampened. In a parametrized version of the model, a rise in idiosyncratic business risk generates a large increase in uncertainty about aggregate investment.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019