Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T17:33:51.305Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

STATUS PREFERENCE AND THE EFFECTS OF PATENT PROTECTION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2016

Shiyuan Pan*
Affiliation:
Zhejiang University
Mengbo Zhang
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
Heng-Fu Zou
Affiliation:
Central University of Finance and Economics
*
Address correspondence to: Shiyuan Pan, Center for Research of Private Economy and School of Economics, Zhejiang University, 38 Zheda Road, Hangzhou 310027, China; e-mail: shiyuanpan@zju.edu.cn.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

We construct a growth model with status preference to explore the effects of patents on innovation and social welfare. We find a nonmonotonic effect of patent protection on innovation. Additionally, the growth-rate-maximizing degree of patent protection decreases when the strength of status preference is larger. The effect of patent protection on social welfare is ambiguous, depending on the strength of status preference. Moreover, wealth inequality widens as patent protection is reinforced. Finally, by using cross-section regression analysis, we document that a nonmonotonic relationship between patent protection and economic growth is statistically significant and that the growth-rate-maximizing degree of patent protection decreases with the strength of status preference.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 
Supplementary material: PDF

Pan supplementary material

Appendices A and B

Download Pan supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 155.3 KB