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TEMPTATION AND SELF-CONTROL IN A MONETARY ECONOMY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2016

Ryoji Hiraguchi*
Affiliation:
Chiba University
*
Address correspondence to: Ryoji Hiraguchi, Faculty of Law and Economics, Chiba University. 1-33, Yayoi-cho, Inage-ku, Chiba, Japan; e-mail: ryojih@chiba-u.jp.
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Abstract

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We construct a microfounded model of money with Gul–Pesendorfer preferences. In each period, agents are tempted to spend all their money by the end of the period, and they suffer from the forgone utility that could have been obtained by adopting the tempting choice. We find that the Friedman rule may not be optimal. A positive nominal interest rate improves welfare because it reduces the real money balances and renders the temptation less attractive. The welfare gained by deviating from the rule is equivalent to 0.67% of consumption.

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016