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UI ELIGIBILITY RULE, MORAL HAZARD, AND OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT TRANSFER SCHEME

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2017

Min Zhang*
Affiliation:
East China Normal University
Jia Pan
Affiliation:
Fudan University
*
Address corresponding to: Min Zhang, Faculty of Economics and Management, East China Normal University, Room 1705, 3663 N. Zhongshan Road, Shanghai 200062, China; e-mail: mzhang@jjx.ecnu.edu.cn.
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Abstract

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This paper derives the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) transfer scheme, UI benefits, and UI contribution fees: When a worker has to earn his or her UI eligibility through work, the UI benefits do not last forever, and the UI agency has imperfect monitoring power on the strategic behavior of the worker. We show that the consideration of the UI eligibility rule generates the effective entitlement effect, which serves as an additional incentive device and alters the nature of the optimal UI transfer scheme established in literature. In contrast with previous studies, we find that when the effective entitlement effect is large, it completely removes the moral hazards in job searches, job acceptances, and job quits. As a result, the optimal UI benefits and contribution fees become constant. Calibrated to the data in the United States, the model reproduces some key features of the existing UI system.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017