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THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND THE DEMAND FOR STATUS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2009

Yulei Luo
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong
Eric R. Young*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
*
Address correspondence to: Dr. Eric R. Young, Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA; e-mail: ey2d@virginia.edu.
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Abstract

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Standard economic theories of asset markets assume that assets are valued entirely for the consumption streams they can finance. This paper examines the introduction of the demand for status (as a function of wealth) into a model of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk—the “spirit of capitalism” (“soc”) assumption. We find that soc preferences lead to less inequality in wealth; placing wealth into the utility function leads to a shrinking wealth distribution. The drop in wealth concentration is smaller if the utility function implies status is a luxury good, but no parametrization leads to higher wealth Gini coefficients than the benchmark case. We then consider the consequences of revenue-neutral tax reforms with and without soc preferences, finding that they make little difference for this policy experiment.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009