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Kleptoparasitic Interactions under Asymmetric ResourceValuation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2014

M. Broom
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical Science, City University London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK
J. Rychtář*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
D. Sykes
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
*
⋆Corresponding author. E-mail: rychtar@uncg.edu

Abstract

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We introduce a game theoretical model of stealing interactions. We model the situation asan extensive form game when one individual may attempt to steal a valuable item fromanother who may in turn defend it. The population is not homogeneous, but rather eachindividual has a different Resource Holding Potential (RHP). We assume that RHP not onlyinfluences the outcome of the potential aggressive contest (the individual with the largerRHP is more likely to win), but that it also influences how an individual values aparticular resource. We investigate several valuation scenarios and study the prevalenceof aggressive behaviour. We conclude that the relationship between RHP and resource valueis crucial, where some cases lead to fights predominantly between pairs of strongindividuals, and some between pairs of weak individuals. Other cases lead to no fightswith one individual conceding, and the order of strategy selection is crucial, where theindividual which picks its strategy first often has an advantage.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, 2014