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On lookahead equilibria in congestion games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2015

VITTORIO BILÒ,
ANGELO FANELLI and
LUCA MOSCARDELLI
VITTORIO BILÒ
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Physics, University of Salento, Lecce, Italy Email: vittorio.bilo@unisalento.it
ANGELO FANELLI
Affiliation:
CNRS, UMR-6211, Caen, France Email: angelo.fanelli@unicaen.fr
LUCA MOSCARDELLI
Affiliation:
Department of Economic Studies, University of Chieti-Pescara, Pescara, Italy Email: luca.moscardelli@unich.it
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Abstract

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We investigate the issues of existence and efficiency of lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Lookahead equilibria, whose study has been initiated by Mirrokni et al. (2012), correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.

Information

Type
Paper
Information
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science , Volume 27 , Special Issue 2: Special Issue: XIV ICTCS , February 2017, pp. 197 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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