Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-48dgx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T23:52:27.263Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Charles Wyplosz*
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva and CEPR

Abstract

Fiscal discipline is as much needed as monetary discipline. Many countries have attempted to counter the deficit bias by adopting fiscal rules that typically set a limit to their annual budget deficits. The record is not satisfactory; rules are either too lax or too tight and then ignored. This article suggests that the solution is to adopt the approach followed by inflation targeting central banks, with great success. Independent and accountable Fiscal Policy Committees, given the task of achieving debt targets and the authority to decide - or recommend - annual deficits, will be free from the deficit bias. This will allow them to exercise discretion in the short run while delivering debt sustainability in the long run.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable