1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baltic States, (London, 1938), pp. 16-18. For more detail, Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States, 1918–1940 (Notre Dame, 1959); Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States. The Years of Independence: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 1917–1940 (Berkeley, 1974).Google Scholar

2. The principle new source is God krizisa, 1938–1939. Dokumenty i materialy, 2 vols. (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990). At this writing, only vol. 1 (29 September 1938-31 May 1939) has been received in the US. All new information from this source and other publications will be designated in the footnotes by an*.Google Scholar

3. XVII S'ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (b), Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1934), p. 14.Google Scholar

4. Ibid., pp. 127-128. Litvinov had read the book in full as early as 1928 [Arthur U. Pope, Maxim Litvinov (New York, 1943), p. 318]. Stalin read it in Russian translation in the summer of 1939 [Dmitrii Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia. Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina, two books in 4 parts (Moscow, 1989), Book II, Part 1, p. 24].Google Scholar

5. Hitler's Secret Book (New York, 1961), p. 195. Record of the Conversation between the Fuehrer and Ciano, 12 August 1939, DGFP, VII, no. 43.Google Scholar

6. The fate that awaited the Baltic States under the Germans is detailed in Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study in Occupation Policies (London & New York, 1957), pp. 49-65; 182-197. Also, Sidney Lowery, “The Ostland,” in Arnold Toynbee & V. Toynbee, eds. Survey of International Affairs. 1939–1946. Hitler's Europe (London, 1954), pp. 568-75. On Sovietization, see United States Congress, House Select Committee, The Baltic States, Third Interim Report of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1954. Also, Romuald J. Misiunas & Rein Taagepura, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940–1980 (Berkeley, 1983).Google Scholar

7. Churchill, Winston, The Gathering Storm (New York, 1961), p. 126. “Hitlerrepeatedly said that he would make no arrangements with any Powers that might deny German advances into Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—'barbaric peoples,’ he called them.” “Memorandum Berlin,” July 15, 1935, Ambassador Dodd (Berlin) FRUS, 1935, II, p. 337.Google Scholar

8. Ahmann, Rolf, “The German Treaties with Estonia and Latvia of June 9, 1939—Bargaining Ploy or an Alternative for German-Soviet Understanding?” Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. XX, no. 4 (Winter, 1989), p. 344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. Speech delivered to Supreme Soviet, November 29, 1939, published in Pravda, December 1, 1936.Google Scholar

10. One source contends that Litvinov proposed to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow that Poland and the USSR partition the Baltic States between them with the Dvina as the dividing line—Bohdan Budorowicz, Polish-Soviet Relations, 1952–1939 (New York, 1963), p. 145. Another source holds that it was the Polish Ambassador who advocated this partition, reasoning that if the Baltic States were to lose their independence it was better to see it bringGoogle Scholar

11. SPE, I, 234. Evidence of such a treaty is lacking.Google Scholar

12. SPE, I, 271 & 279. This was only a rumor. Nevertheless, Germany's growing economic influence in the Baltic in the course of 1939 led to conclusion of secret agreements with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to send 70% of their exports to Germany. DGFP, D, vol. 9, p. 59. Seppo Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise 1938–1941 (Stuttgart, 1979), pp.108-10.Google Scholar

13. God krizisa, no. 101, A. F. Merekalov to Litvinov, Berlin, 5 January 1939. God krizisa, no. 104, Mikoyan to Merekalov, Moscow, 8 January 1939. Ibid., no. 110, advantage to Poland and the Soviet Union rather than see Germany and the Soviet Union “split the loot”—Albert Tarulis, Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States, p. 101. Merekalov to Litvinov, Berlin, 12 January 1939.Google Scholar

14. God krizisa, no. 123, Ia.Z. Surits to Litvinov, Paris, 27 January 1939. But experts at the Quai d'Orsay regarded the Treaty as having very limited application under current circumstances; e.g., “indirect aggression” by Germany against the Baltic States would not bring the Treaty into play. Memorandum, 29 December 1938, no. 247, and Memorandum, n.d. January 1939, no. 475, DDF, XIII.Google Scholar

15. God krizisa, no. 168, Maisky to Litvinov, London, 2 March 1939.Google Scholar

16. XVIII S'ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow 1939), pp. 14-15.Google Scholar

17. A point duly noted and reported to Berlin by Ambassador Werner von Schulenburg from Moscow, but it excited little interest in Berlin. [Schulenburg to Foreign Ministry, 13 March 1939, DGFP, Series D, vol. VI, no. 1].Google Scholar

18. The threat made by Stalin at the previous Congress of the Party was now echoed by L.Z. Mekhlis, Chief of the Red Army's Political Administration. If the second imperialist war turned on the USSR, he declared, it would be the task of the Red Army “to carry military operations to the territory of the enemy, to fulfill its international obligations and multiply the number of Soviet republics.” [XVIII S'ezd., p. 273].Google Scholar

19. Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 20 March 1939, DBFP, Series III, vol. 4, no. 452. Payart to Bonnet, Moscow, 11 March 1939, DDF, XIV, no. 306. But Payart also pointed out, à propos, that two currents of opinion clashed in Soviet policy toward Germany: rapprochement versus opposition. The first prevails when the USSR believes itself isolated; the second, when it feels that it is supported by the western powers and the United States. [Payart to Bonnet, Moscow, 19 March 1939, ibid., vol. XV, no. 67] Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Moscow, 13 March 1939, op. cit. Google Scholar

20. Record of Conversation between Litvinov and Irie-Koskinen, A. S., 5 March 1939, God Krizisa, no. 171 and *no. 174, 8 March 1939.Google Scholar

21. God Krizisa, no. 180, Record of a Conversation between Stein and Erkko, 11 March 1939, and *no. 181, Record of a Conversation between Stein and Finland's Minister of Finances V. Tanner, 13 March 1939. Foreign Ministry to Schulenburg, Berlin, 21 March 1939, DGFP, VII, no. 60.Google Scholar

22. SPE, vol. I, no. 192.Google Scholar

23. Peace Treaty between Russia and Estonia, 2 February 1920 in DVP SSSR, vol. II, no. 229. Peace Treaty between Russia and Latvia, 11 August 1920, in Ibid., vol. III, no. 53.Google Scholar

24. Orde (Riga) to Halifax, 27 April 1939, DBFP, V, no. 300. Enclosures 2 and 3. Also, Orde (Riga) to Halifax, Ibid., no. 181. Alfred Bilmanis, ed., Latvian-Russian Relations (Washington, DC, 1944), pp. 188-89.Google Scholar

25. In June 1937, Vilhelm Munters, Foreign Minister of Latvia, was told by Litvinov that article 16 on sanctions was unconditionally binding on all member states and that transit rights of a foreign power in enforcement of military sanctions as stipulated by the Covenant were valid irrespective of the views of the states concerned. Munters insisted that this proviso was obsolete; application of article 16 was wholly dependent on assent of the states concerned. Litvinov concluded that the Latvian position was a consequence of German intimidation [Seppo Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise 1938–1941 (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 22-23].Google Scholar

26. DGFP, V, no. 436, “Circular of the Foreign Ministry,” Berlin, 6 July 1938.Google Scholar

27. Walters, F. P., History of the League of Nations, 2 vols. (London, 1952), vol. 2, pp. 716 & 779. The Polish Government “had vied with Hitler and Mussolini in its contempt for the League.” Ibid., pp. 779 & 793.Google Scholar

28. Sabaliunes, L., Lithuania in Crisis, (Bloomington, IN, 1972), pp. 19-20.Google Scholar

29. God krizisa, no. 196.Google Scholar

30. Halifax to British Ambassadors in Paris, Moscow, and Warsaw, 20 March 1939, DBFP, vol. IV, no. 446. Litvinov to Soviet Ambassadors in Britain and France, 22 March 1939, no. 178. Maisky to Litvinov, 18 March 1939, no. 197, Litvinov to Maisky (London) and Surits (Paris), and no. 198 SPE, I.Google Scholar

31. Halifax to Seeds (Moscow) 19 March 1939, DBFP, IV, no. 433.Google Scholar

32. The Poles quite categorically, and the Romanians less so, informed Britain that they would not join in any combination that included the USSR [Maisky to Litvinov, 29 March 1939, SPE, I, no. 194].Google Scholar

33. DBFP, IV, nos. 582 and 489.Google Scholar

34. Seeds to Halifax, 1 April 1939, Ibid., no. 597.Google Scholar

35. Seeds (Moscow) to Halifax, 3 April 1939, Ibid., no. 608.Google Scholar

36. Litvinov to Maisky, 4 April 1939, SPE, I, no. 210.Google Scholar

37. Communique, 6 April 1939, DBFP, V, no. 10.Google Scholar

38. Halifax to Seeds (Moscow), 6 April 1939, DBFP, V, no. 19.Google Scholar

39. Halifax to Seeds (Moscow), 11 April 1939, Ibid., no.42. Maisky to Litvinov, 6 April 1939, SPE, I, no. 214.Google Scholar

40. Litvinov to Surits (Paris), 11 April 1939, Ibid., no. 223.Google Scholar

41. Seeds to Halifax, 13 April 1939, DBFP, V, no. 52.Google Scholar

42. Halifax to Hoare (Bucharest), 13 April 1939, Ibid., no. 61.Google Scholar

43. Halifax to Seeds (Moscow), 14 April 1939, Ibid., no. 170.Google Scholar

44. Seeds (Moscow) to Halifax, 15 April 1939, Ibid., no. 182.Google Scholar

45. Surits to Litvinov, 14 April 1939, SPE, I, 232. Bonnet to Ambassador Naggiar (Moscow), Paris, 14 April 1939, DDF, vol. XV, no. 387.Google Scholar

46. Litvinov Proposal, Moscow, 17 April 1939, SPE, I, no. 239. Seeds to Halifax, 18 April 1939, DBFP, V, no. 201.Google Scholar

47. Surits to Litvinov, Paris, 18 April 1939, SPE, I, no. 201.Google Scholar

48. Litvinov to Surits, 18 April 1939, Ibid., no. 244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49. Snow (Helsingfors) to Halifax, 20 April 1939, DBFP, v, NO. 231.Google Scholar

50. Preston (Kovno) to Orde (Riga), 2 April 1939, Ibid., no. 265.Google Scholar

51. Treaty text, article 2, DGFP, V, no. 405.Google Scholar

52. Foreign Ministry to Naggiar (Moscow), Paris, 25 April 1939, DDF, XV, no. 487.Google Scholar

53. Surits to Litvinov, Paris, 29 April 1939, SPE, I, nos. 261, 262, and 263.Google Scholar

54. Halifax to Phipps (Paris), 28 April 1939, DGFP, V, no. 205.Google Scholar

55. The phrase on occupying the Baltic States was deleted from the plan two days later [“Operation White,” dated 11 April 1939, DGFP, VI, no. 184, pp. 224-25].Google Scholar

56. Stalin stayed Beria's hand just in time; punishment of Litvinov was limited to dismissal from office [*Dmitrii Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia. Politicheskii portret I.V. Stalina, book II, part 1, pp. 15-16, 18].Google Scholar

57. Halifax to Seeds (Moscow), 6 May 1939, DBFP, V, no.389.Google Scholar

58. Halifax to Loraine (Rome), 6 May 1939, Ibid., no. 398.Google Scholar

59. Halifax to Seeds (Moscow), 6 May 1939, DBFP, V, NO.397.Google Scholar

60. Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 8 May 1939, Ibid., no. 413.Google Scholar

61. Charmley, John, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, (London, 1989), p. 185.Google Scholar

62. Statement 4 July 1939, quoted in Sidney Aster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War, (London, 1973), p. 272.Google Scholar

63. Manne, Robert, “The British Decision for Alliance with Russia,” Journal of Contemporary History, no. 3 (1974), pp. 34-36.Google Scholar

64. Quoted in Ian Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (New York, 1971), p. 228.Google Scholar

65. When the German-Soviet Non-aggression Treaty was announced, he was far less worried by it than his colleagues [Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, British Politics, and British Policy, 1939–1940 (London, 1975), pp. 302-3].Google Scholar

66. Seeds (Moscow) to Halifax, 9 May 1939, DBFP, V, no. 421 and 436. According to D. C. Watt, the Russians had an edge in these negotiations, thanks to John Herbert King, their spy in the communications room of the Foreign Office [D. C. Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939 (London, 1989), pp. 116, 231, 248, 367, 375 and 378].Google Scholar

67. Ambassador, Soviet (Tallinn) to Molotov, 10 May 1939, SPE, II, no. 287.Google Scholar

68. Weber, Die Entstehungsgeschichte, p. 185. Seppo Mylleniemi, Die baltische Krise, pp. 48-49.Google Scholar

69. Weber, Die Entstehungsgeschichte, p. 184.Google Scholar

70. As Hitler proceeded to isolat Poland diplomatically, he sai, “It is not ruled out that Russia might disinterest herself in the destruction of Poland” [“Minutes of a Conference on May 23, 1939,” DGFP, VI, no. 433].Google Scholar

71. Molotov to Seeds, 14 May 1939, SPE, II, no. 291. Seeds to Halifax, 15 May 1939, DBFP, V, no. 520, pp. 558-9.Google Scholar

72. In this connection, the views expressed by Winston Churchill on 19 May, in the House of Commons, were most cogent. See Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York, 1961), pp. 334-35.Google Scholar

73. Strang, Lord, At Home and Abroad (London, 1956), pp. 188-194.Google Scholar

74. Aster, 1939, p. 279, SPE, II, no. 367.Google Scholar

75. Aster, 1939, p. 280.Google Scholar

76. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, 17 April 1939, no. 215. Memorandum, Schnurre, 17 May 1939, no. 406. DGFP, VI. Record of Conversation between Molotov and Schulenburg, 20 May 1939, “Na rokovom poroge,” Voprosy istorii, no. 11, 1989, pp. 105-6 and Memorandum, Schulenburg, Moscow, 20 May 1939, NSR, pp. 5-7.Google Scholar

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79. Schulenburg to Weizsäcker, Moscow, 5 June 1939, Ibid., no. 478.Google Scholar

80. SPE, II, no. 325.Google Scholar

81. Memorandum (Woermann), Berline, 15 June 1939, DGFP, VI, no.529.Google Scholar

82. Schulenburg to Weizsäcker, Moscow, 29 June 1939, DGFP, VI, no. 579.Google Scholar

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86. Britain agreed on July 22 to grant Japan a more or less free hand in China. This coincided with the Japanese attack on Soviet-Mongolian forces east of the Khalkhin Gol river [Craigie to Halifax, Tokyo, 23 July 1939, no. 365, DBFP, IX. “Japanese Provocation Continues” (TASS Communique), 27 July 1939, SPE, II, no. 387].Google Scholar

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91. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Moscow, 4 August 1939, DGFP, VI, no. 766.Google Scholar

92. Memorandum (Schnurre), Berlin, 3 August 1939, DGFP, VI, no. 761.Google Scholar

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95. Moscow had just publicly protested in the Soviet press that it had no intention of encroaching on the independence of the Baltic States, contrary to a statement ascribed to R. H. Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Both sides favored guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic States. It was disagreement over defining “indirect aggression” that was at issue. TASS Statement, 2 August 1939, SPE, II, no. 392. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Moscow, 3 August 1939, DGFP, VI, no. 764.Google Scholar

96. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Moscow, 10 August 1939, DGFP, VII, nos. 14 and 15.Google Scholar

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98. Schnurre to Schulenburg, Berlin, 14 August, 1939. Ibid., no. 50.Google Scholar

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107. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, 14 August 1939, Ibid., no. 56. Schulenburg was instructed that an “audience” for a “detailed discussion” with Stalin as well as a conference with Molotov would be a condition for Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow.Google Scholar

108. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 16 August 1939, Ibid., no. 70 and 79.Google Scholar

109. Schulenburg to Weizsäcker, Moscow, 16 August 1939, Ibid., no. 88.Google Scholar

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111. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 16 August 1939, Ibid., no. 75. “K 50-letiiu,” p. 76.Google Scholar

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113. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 18 August 1939, Ibid., no. 113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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118. A similar clause is found in article 2 of the Soviet-Polish nonaggression treaty.Google Scholar

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120. Memorandum, (Schnurre), Berlin, 19 August 1939, Ibid., no. 123.Google Scholar

121. Schnurre to Schulenburg, Berlin, 19 August (sic) 1939, Ibid., no. 135. Text of the agreement, Ibid., no. 131.Google Scholar

122. Still wary of a Soviet trap, Ribbentrop ordered Schulenburg to deliver the Hitler message on a sheet of paper without letterhead. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 20 August 1939, Ibid., no. 142.Google Scholar

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129. Ibid., pp. 572-75.Google Scholar

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137. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, p. 111.Google Scholar

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144. Texts of Mutual Assistance Treaties: Estonia, Mirovoi khoziastvo i mirovaia politika, no. 9 (September 1939), pp. 18-20; Latvia, Ibid., no. 10. (October 1939), pp. 3-4; Lithuania, Ibid., pp. 5-7.Google Scholar