1. In addition to the references cited hereafter, the most valuable material is: Edward Táborský, “Beneš and the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, 27:2 (January 1949): 302–314; “The Triumph and Disaster of Edward Beneš,” Foreign Affairs, 36:4 (July 1958): 669–684; Beneš and Stalin-Moscow, 1943 and 1945,” Journal of Central European Affairs, 13:2 (July 1953); Demares Bess, “Roosevelt's Secret Deal Doomed Czechoslovakia,” Saturday Evening Post, 17 April 1948, p. 26 ff. In his Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954), Beneš discusses extensively his meetings with Stalin and Molotov. See also Victor S. Mamatey and Luza Radomir, eds., A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948 (Princeton University Press, 1973), especially chapter 6 (Piotr S. Wandycz, “Foreign Policy of Edvard Beneš 1918–1936.”); Joseph S. Roucek and Jîrí Škvor, “Beneš and Munich: A Reappraisal,” East European Quarterly, 10:3 (Fall 1976): 375–385; Richard A. Woytak, “Polish-Hungarian Relations and the Carpatho-Ukrainian Question in October 1938,” East European Quarterly, 10:3 (Fall 1976): 367–374; Richard B. Lewandowski, “The Phanton Government: The United States and the Recognition of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1939–1943,” The Southern Quarterly, 11:4 (July 1973): 371–388; Marian Mark Stolarik, The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czechoslovakia 1914–1918 (Cleveland, Ohio: Slovak Institutem, 1968).Google Scholar

2. Zinner, Paul E., “Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Edward Beneš,” in Craig, Gordon A. et al., eds., The Diplomats 1919–1939 (Princeton University Press, 1953).Google Scholar

3. Táborský, “The Triumph and Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, p. 671.Google Scholar

4. See Beneš, Edward, Democracy Today and Tomorrow (New York: Macmillan, 1939); Karel Hudec, ed., Edward Beneš in His Own Words: Threescore Years of a Stateman, Builder, and Philosopher (New York: Czech-American Alliance, Eastern Division, 1944); A. St. Magr, ed., Gedanke und Staat: Aus den Schriften und Reden von Edward Beneš, 3 vols. (Prague: Orbis, 1937); Zinner, “Czechoslovakia.”Google Scholar

5. The “Drang nach Osten” theory has its roots in the pre-World War I days, when some leading German scholars believed that a struggle between Teutons and Slavs was unavoidable and that Germany must dominate Europe and eventually the world; thus, according to Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), Germany did not blunder into World War I but had a clear program for conquest, and if one is to believe Fischer, there was little difference between Wilhelm II and Hitler. See also Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (Princeton University Press, 1968); Curt Geyer, Hitler's New Kaiser's Old Order (London: Hutchinson, 1942); Ihor Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plan for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961): Joseph S. Roucek, “Geopolitics,” in T. V. Kalijarvi et al., Modern World Politics (New York: Crowell, 1959).Google Scholar

6. Táborský, “Beneš and the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, p. 305.Google Scholar

7. Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938–1948 (Princeton University Press, 1959).Google Scholar

8. Ibid., p. 79.Google Scholar

9. Ibid.Google Scholar

10. Zděnek Fierlinger, Ve službách ČSR [In the Services of the Czechoslovak Republic) (Prague: Dělnické nakladatelství, 1947), vol. I, pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

11. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, p. 81.Google Scholar

12. Ibid, p. 82.Google Scholar

13. Táborský, “Benes and the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, pp. 310–311.Google Scholar

14. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, pp. 84–84. In addition to the references cited in chapter on minorities, the section on Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine), see also Němec, František and Moundry, Vladislav, The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto: W. B. Anderson, 1955). On the general historical background of this region see Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848–1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. I, chapter 13, “The Ruthenians and the National Organization in Bukovina,” pp. 318–332, and extensive notes, pp. 440–444.Google Scholar

15. Taborsky, “Beneš and the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, p. 311.Google Scholar

16. Ibid. This period of Beneš’ negotiations with Stalin is well described in Kovrig, Bennett, The Myth of Liberation: East Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy And Politics Since 1941 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 18–20. Some interesting comments on Benes’ personality and his attitudes can be found in František Moravec, Master of Spies: The Memoirs of General František Moravec (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), where we learn, for instance, that “in return for the Communists’ consent to his continuation office, Beneš had committed himself in Moscow on several matters which he did not immediately divulge to his London entourage” (p. 219), that “my efforts (of Moravec) to convince Beneš that we could not trust (the Soviets) were in vain: (p. 222), or that “the advancing Russian armies would not enter Czechoslovakia … that Czechoslovakia, being on the border of the Russian sphere, would become the bridge for peaceful coexistence between East and West” (p. 229).Google Scholar

17. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, pp. 87–88.Google Scholar

18. Ibid., p. 89.Google Scholar

19. Ibid., p. 91.Google Scholar

20. Ibid., pp. 70–72, 98. Korbel reports that “though this agreement had probably been reached at the Tehran Conference in November 1943, the Czechoslovak government was never informed about it, vital as it was in the national interests and the future of the country.” (p. 98).Google Scholar

21. Ibid., pp. 103–104.Google Scholar

22. Ibid., p. 104.Google Scholar

23. Táborský, “Beneš and the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, p. 312.Google Scholar

24. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, pp. 110–111.Google Scholar

25. Roucek, Joseph S., “Czechoslovakia Today,” I1 Politico, 34:1 (1969): 126–147.Google Scholar

26. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, p. 112.Google Scholar

27. Ibid. See also Táborský, Edward, “Beneš and Stalin-Moscow, 1943 and 1945,” Journal of Central European Affairs, pp. 154–181.Google Scholar

28. Ibid., pp. 112–113.Google Scholar

29. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, p. 114.Google Scholar

30. Ibid.Google Scholar

31. Some very valuable comments on Jan Masaryk's personality and his career can be found in Davenport, Marcia, Too Strong for Fantasy (New York: Pocket Books, 1968).Google Scholar

32. Korbel, , The Communist Subversion, p. 120.Google Scholar

33. Memoirs of Dr. Edward Beneš, p. 263. The italics are in Beneš’ text. Beneš, on his way back to London, went to Marrakesh, where Churchill was recuperating, to tell him about his experiences in Moscow.Google Scholar

34. Táborský, “Beneš and Stalin-Moscow, 1942 and 1945,” Foreign Affairs, p. 181.Google Scholar

35. Bess, Demares, “Roosevelt's Secret Deal Doomed Czechoslovakia,” Saturday Evening Post, 17 April 1948, p. 26 ff. We have summarized here this journalistic but valuable article.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., p. 27.Google Scholar

37. Ibid., p. 137.Google Scholar

38. Ibid. The Yalta Conference is summarized in Fenne, Richard J. Jr., The Yalta Conference (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1955).Google Scholar

39. Chester Wilmet, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers 1952).Google Scholar

40. Ambrose, Stephen E., Eisenhower and Berlin 1945: Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), p. 84 and “A note on Sources,” p. 107–111. The complicated aspects of this decision are well described in Tad Szulc, Czechoslovakia Since World War II (New York: Viking, 1971), Chapter I, “The Liberation of Czechoslovakia: The Red Army Arrives.” See also Bennett Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; William Bancroft Mellor, General Patton: The Last Cavalier (new York: Putnam's, 1971); Kurt Glaser, Czechoslovakia: A Critical History (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1961): Forrest C. Pogue, “Why the Russians Get Berlin and Prague,” Journal of Modern History, 23:4 (December 1951). Pogue included this information in his The Supreme Command, vol. IV of The United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1954) pp. 500 ff; John Toland, The Last Days (New York: Bantam, 1970), pp. 631–637; Robert S. Allen, Patton's Third U.S. Army: Lucky Forward (New York: Mentor Books, 1974), pp. 290–291. For some strange reason, historical writings on this period seldom note the almost forgotten figure of Lieutenant General Andrei A. Vlasov, former military adviser to Chiang Kai-Shek and one of the heroes of the Moscow defense, who had been captured by the Germans near Leningrad. Disillusioned with Stalin, Hitler, although suspicious of him, gave him permission to organize an initial force of 50,000 men of Russians (The Russian Army of Liberation). His army reached the region of Beroun, some 25 miles southwest of Prague, and at the request of Czech delegated officers, saved Prague on May 4 from the planned Nazi destruction. With the arrival of Marshal Konev's troops about half of the Vlasovites escaped across the Anglo-American lines; the rest were brought back to the Soviet Union as captives, and Vlasov together with some of his officers were hanged in Moscow. For details see Toland, The Last Days, pp. 299, 634–45, 650; Jurgen Thorwald, The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Armies (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Lev F. Dobriansky, “The Phantasmogoric Russian N.T.S.,” Ukrainian Quarterly, 7:2 (Spring 1951): 170–178; Sven Steenberg, Vlasov (New York: Knopf, 1970); George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 218–222.Google Scholar

41. Ambrose, , Eisenhower and Berlin 1945, p. 84.Google Scholar

42. Ibid.Google Scholar

43. Toland, John, The Last 100 Days (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 564. We have summarized Toland's version here. Truman's version in his Memoirs, Harry S. Truman, vol. I: One Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 213–217.Google Scholar

44. Edward Táborský, “The Triumph and Disaster of Edward Beneš,” Foreign Affairs, 36:4 (July 1958): 669–684, 680.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45. Toland, , The Last 100 Days, p. 566 and bibliography, 608–9.Google Scholar

46. Ibid.Google Scholar

47. Ibid., p. 567, footnote. Of interest is Eisenhower's report on his decision. In Eisenhower's Own Story of the War: The Complete Report by the Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower on the War in Europe from the Day of Invasion to the Day of Victory (New York: Arce Publishing Co., 1946), the Pilsen incident is disposed of in one sentence (p. 107): “On 18 April the Allies set foot in Czechoslovakia.” In Report by the Supreme Commander of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operation in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, 6 June, 1944 to 8 May, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1946), Eisenhower writes: “… Pilsen was captured on 6 May. These operations were carried out in full coordination with the Russians approaching from the East. The American troops advanced to the line of Budějovice-Pilsen-Karlsbad, but were halted there while the Red Army cleared the east and west banks of the Moldau River and occupied Prague …” In Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), “Patton directed to V to push eastward in Czechoslovakia. The corps captured Pilsen May 6. In this area the Russian forces were rapidly advancing from the east and careful coordination was again necessary. By agreement we directed the American troops to occupy the line Pilsen-Karlsbad, while of Czechoslovakia the agreed line of junction ran down the Budějovice-Linz railroad and from there along the valley of the Enns River …” (pp. 417–418). We learn from Col. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward, that “A reporter asked why Prague had not been occupied by the Third Army. ‘I'll tell you why we didn't take Prague,’ said Patton. The newsmen poised their pencils for a ‘short story.’ ‘We didn't take Prague,’ said Patton, ‘because we were ordered not to.’ The reporters joined in the laugh” (p. 388).Google Scholar

48. Ibid., p. 567.Google Scholar

49. Toland, , The Last 100 Days, p. 568.Google Scholar

50. Ibid., pp. 568–69.Google Scholar

51. Ibid., pp. 580–81, states that “Dr. Otakar Machotka, a member of the revolutionary Czech National Council, emphatically claims that the Vlasovites were dismissed by the Czechs.”Google Scholar

52. Ibid., pp. 561–62.Google Scholar

53. Bess, “Roosevelt's Secret Deal,” Saturday Evening Post, 17 April, 1948, pp. 137–38.Google Scholar