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Ukraine and the Yugoslav Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Taras Kuzio
Taras Kuzio*
Affiliation:
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK
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Extract

Even before gaining independence in December 1991 from the former USSR, Ukraine had supported Slovenia and Croatia's drive to independence from the former Yugoslavia. In May 1991, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman paid an official visit to Ukraine where then parliamentary speaker Leonid Kravchuk expressed sympathy with Croatia's desire for independence. Tudjman pointed out how Ukraine's seat at the United Nations had given it a head start in obtaining international recognition of its independent status. On 12 December 1991, twelve days after the Ukrainian referendum on independence, Kyiv became one of the first states to diplomatically recognise Croatia and Slovenia; and further, it announced its readiness to open embassies in both countries. Ukraine was the first member of the U.N. to recognise Croatia; the second and third countries, Slovenia and Lithuania, were not members of the U.N. when they recognised Croatia.

Information

Type
Part III: International Reactions to Yugoslavia's Disintegration
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 25 , Issue 3: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Inevitable or Avoidable? , September 1997, pp. 587 - 600
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. Ustina Markus, “Ukraine and the Yugoslav Conflict,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 30, 23 July 1993, pp. 36–37.Google Scholar

2. On Russian policy towards Yugoslavia see Suzanne Crow, “Soviet Reaction to the Crisis in Yugoslavia,” Report on the USSR, 2 August 1991; “Reading Moscow's Policies toward the Rump Yugoslavia,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 446, November 1992; “Russia and the Macedonian Question,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 45, 13 November 1992; and “Russia Adopts a More Active Policy,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 12, 19 March 1993.Google Scholar

3. Until 1994 the majority of Western academics, journalists and government officials all shared the view that Ukraine and Russia were indeed one and the same and that Ukrainian indepedence was a “temporary phenomenon.” Sooner or later, therefore, Ukraine would return to its “normal” state of affairs as a satellite of Russia, or it would be re-incorporated. This view is still held by the majority of Russian public opinion.Google Scholar

4. Post Postup, No. 4, 24 February-13 March 1994.Google Scholar

5. Zerkalo Nedeli, 2–8 September 1995.Google Scholar

6. Jonathan Eyal, “Minority Problems in Eastern Europe,” General Seminar Series, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, The University of Birmingham, 1 November 1995. The Russian media immediately understood this as well, pointing to the regulation of the Bosnian conflict as something which could be applied to the CIS.Google Scholar

7. See Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, Ukraine. Perestroika to Independence (London: Macmillan, 1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. This mainly revolved around domestic questions. With regard to the former Yugoslavia, members of Rukh had no difficulty cooperating with members of the pro-Kravchuk Ukrainian Republican Party within parliamentary commissions or as a member together in foreign delegations.Google Scholar

9. See Taras Kuzio, “Ukrainian Security Policy,” The Washington Papers, Vol. 167 (Washington, DC: Praeger for The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995).Google Scholar

10. Then presidential adviser on foreign affairs, appointed First Deputy Foreign Minister in October 1995.Google Scholar

11. During the 1994 parliamentary elections Pavlychko was chairman of the (national democratic) Democratic Coalition “Ukraine” bloc.Google Scholar

12. Appointed First Deputy Prime Minister with responsability for Security in mid-1995.Google Scholar

13. After the 1994 presidential elections, Zlenko was removed from the post of Foreign Minister and transfered to the post of Ambassador to the U.N. Tarasiuk was appointed Ambassador to the Benelux countries and liaison to the EU and NATO in mid-1995 (his replacement was Buteiko).Google Scholar

14. Interview with Mykhailo Honchar, Senior Research Fellow, National Institute for Strategic Studies (National Security Council), Kyiv, 29 November 1995.Google Scholar

15. In contrast, the Ukrainian media (including Russian-language publications) had all taken a pro-Chechen position.Google Scholar

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18. Copy in the author's possession of internal report No. 542 (16 October 1992) from V. Prymachenko, the Representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Yugoslavia, addressed to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, N. P. Makarevych.Google Scholar

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44. Narodna Armiya, 24 November 1995.Google Scholar

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46. Many accusations of Ukrainian sanction busting made by the Western media have since been proved to be performed by Russians. A U.N. inspection team later confirmed that there was no evidence that Ukraine had violated U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia. However, these accusations led to the circulation of instructions by the Cabinet of Ministers to relevant government agencies to secure the implementation of these sanctions. Many of the shipments affected by these measures were of petroleum products by Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey to Austria, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia along the Danube river. A group attempting to smuggle more than four tons of ammunition to Croatia was arrested by the Ukrainian authorities, who seized their plane and cargo.Google Scholar

Ukrainian weapons have also been illegally supplied to the Croats and Bosnian Muslims (possibly with the U.S. government turning a blind eye).Google Scholar

47. U. Markus, “Ukraine and the Yugoslav Conflict,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 30, 23 July 1993, pp. 39–41. Molod Ukrainy, 14 May 1993; and Moscow News, 4 June 1993 claimed that Ukrainian losses due to the sanctions by mid-1993 amounted to $2 billion.Google Scholar

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52. Tanjug News Agency, 7 May 1995.Google Scholar

53. Reuters, 28 September 1995.Google Scholar

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55. Interfax News Agency, 7 September 1995. See also Andrij Wynnyckyj, “UWC Studies Plight of Ukrainians Trapped in the Bosnian Quagmire,” The Ukrainian Weekly, 15 October 1995 which reports that Ukrainians were used as shields and targeted for atrocities near Banja Luka.Google Scholar

56. Holos Ukrainy, 21 September 1995.Google Scholar

57. Interview with Bohdan Horyn, Kyiv, 26 November 1995.Google Scholar

58. Interview with Mykhailo Honchar, Senior Research Fellow, National Institute of Strategic Studies (National Security Council), Kyiv, 29 November 1995.Google Scholar

59. Holos Ukrainy, 21 September 1995.Google Scholar

60. Shliakh Peremohy, 27 May 1995: See appendix for a breakdown of the terror inflicted on Ukrainians and Rusyns in Croatia by the Serbs.Google Scholar

61. Interview with Mykhailo Honchar, Senior Research Fellow, National Institute for Strategic Studies (National Security Council), Kyiv, 29 November 1995.Google Scholar