Reading Plutarch's Parallel Lives is a fascinating encounter with the history of the ancient world. It includes witnessing the foundation of Athens (Thes. 24.1–3) and Rome (Rom. 11.1–12.1); participating in the battles of Salamis (Arist. 9.1–4; Them. 13.1–15.4), Pharsalus (Pomp. 69.1–72.6; Caes. 42.1–45.8), Philippi (Brut. 49.1–10), and Actium (Ant. 65.1–66.8);Footnote 1 marvelling at Alexander sitting on Darius’ throne (Alex. 37.7); being dazzled by the wonderful buildings on the Acropolis (Per. 12.1–13.14); watching in dismay as Caesar is killed with twenty-three dagger blows (Caes. 66.1–14); sharing Pyrrhus’ desperation with one more victory (Pyrrh. 21.14); and standing aghast at the rape of the Sabines (Rom. 14.1–15.7), the tragic fate of Spartacus (Crass. 8.1–11.10), and Hannibal's triumph at Cannae (Fab. 16.1–9). It is a rendezvous with so many distinguished figures of Greek and Roman history: the protagonists and antagonists of the Lives, of course, but also the many less-known figures behind the scene, like Mnesiphilus, the teacher of Themistocles (Them. 2.6–7) or Damon, the brains behind the young Pericles (Per. 4.1–4). The decisive moments of history, such as Caesar's famous alea iacta est before his crossing of the Rubicon (Caes. 32.8; Pomp. 60.4), or his veni vidi vici at Zela (Caes. 50.3), are juxtaposed with ‘petite histoire’ with all its juicy anecdotes: Demetrius’ liaison with Lamia (Demetr. 27.1–14), Pericles’ relationship with Aspasia (Per. 24.2–12), Pompey's fondness for Flora (Pomp. 2.5–8), and, of course, Antony's notorious affair with Cleopatra (Ant. 36.1–7; 53.5–12; 71.4–86.9).
The Parallel Lives are an inexhaustible source of information: we read how Archimedes was killed (Marc. 19.8–12) and how the famous sculptor Phidias met his end (Per. 31.5), how the opulent Crassus as a young man lived in a cave from fear of Marius (Crass. 4.1–6.1), how Agesilaus used a stick as a hobbyhorse when playing with his children (Ages. 25.11), and how Demosthenes shaved one side of his head in order to force himself to stay inside and practise his vocal production (Dem. 7.6). In many respects, the Parallel Lives are the via regia to the ancient world, and walking this road is never boring or disappointing, for Plutarch is an extremely talented storyteller. Many of his biographies contain ‘great scenes’Footnote 2 that are elaborated in lively detail.Footnote 3 The Parallel Lives are the absolute culmination of his biographical technique.
They were not, however, his first biographical project, for he had already written the Lives of the Caesars, a series of connected biographies of Roman emperors from Augustus to Vitellius.Footnote 4 Only two of them (Galba and Otho) are still extant. In both, much attention is given to the Platonic idea of the precarious dependence of a commander on his army (Galba 1.3; cf. Plato, Resp. 375b4–c6). This is a guiding thought throughout these Lives, crystallized in the recurrent motif of severed heads.Footnote 5 Plutarch also wrote individual biographies, such as the Life of Aratus and the Life of Artaxerxes.Footnote 6 These, though not conceived as (part of) a pair, have much in common with the Parallel Lives.
Of these Parallel Lives, twenty-two pairs have come down to us. They consist of one Greek and one Roman.Footnote 7 The first pair, which does not survive, probably dealt with the lives of Epameinondas and Scipio.Footnote 8 We know that the fifth pair was Demosthenes–Cicero (Dem. 3.1), the tenth Pericles–Fabius Maximus (Per. 2.5), and the twelfth Dion–Brutus (Dion 2.7). However, the relative chronology of the whole series is particularly difficult to reconstruct, especially since the time of composition may often have been different from the time of publication. There are many cross-references between different Lives, but their reliability is not always clear and they sometimes even contradict one another. Nikolaidis, the most recent scholar to discuss this quaestio vexata in detail, proposes the following order of publication:Footnote 9
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Epameinondas – Scipio
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Pelopidas – Marcellus
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Cimon – Lucullus
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Philopoemen – Flamininus
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Demosthenes – Cicero
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Lycurgus – Numa
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Theseus – Romulus
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Solon – Publicola
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Themistocles – Camillus
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Pericles – Fabius Maximus
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Aemilius – Timoleon
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Dion – Brutus
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Aristides – Cato Maior
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Alexander – Caesar
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Agesilaus – Pompey
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Phocion – Cato Minor
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Demetrius – Antony
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Coriolanus – Alcibiades
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Nicias – Crassus
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Agis / Cleomenes – Gracchi
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Lysander – Sulla
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Sertorius – Eumenes
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Pyrrhus – Marius
Several arguments on which this order is based remain quite hypothetical though, and the absolute chronology is no less uncertain. The most likely guess is that Plutarch began writing the Parallel Lives after ad 96 and continued until his death.Footnote 10
Many of the Greek Lives deal with famous figures of the classical period (notably from Athens, but also from Sparta and Thebes), but Hellenistic statesmen and generals receive a fair deal of attention too (especially in later Lives). The Roman Lives, for their part, include several biographies of early kings and generals (going back to Romulus himself) but also focus on the leading figures of the Late Republic from the Gracchi to Antony.
As a rule, each book consists of four components: a proem, the first Life, the second Life, and a concluding comparison (synkrisis) of the two protagonists.Footnote 11 Not all books, however, have a proem or synkrisis. The two Lives are nearly always placed in chronological order (which usually implies that the Greek comes first),Footnote 12 with the second one often providing an interesting and complicating variation of the first.Footnote 13
1. The purpose of the Parallel Lives
Although many different views have been proposed concerning the goal of the Parallel Lives, scholars now basically agree about their moral purpose.Footnote 14 This scholarly consensus rests on the analysis of several famous proems. In the celebrated proem to the book Alexander–Caesar, for instance, Plutarch explains that his heuristic method is conditioned by his moral interest (1.2):
It is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives; and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice; nay, a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities.Footnote 15
The proems to the pairs Aemilius–Timoleon and Pericles–Fabius Maximus emphasize the moral relevance of the Parallel Lives even more. The heroes are presented to the reader as moral examples worthy of imitation (Aem. 1.1–2 and Per. 1.3–4):
It befell me to begin the writing of my Lives for the sake of others, but to continue the work and delight in it now for my own sake also, using historyFootnote 16 as a mirror and endeavouring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein depicted (ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον). For the result is like nothing else than daily living and associating together, when I receive and welcome each subject of my history in turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe carefully (ἀναθεωρῶμεν)
‘how great he was and what sort of man,’ [Homer, Il. 24.630]
and select from his career what is most important and most beautiful to know.Footnote 17
Our intellectual vision must be applied to such objects as, by their very charm, invite it onward to its own proper good. Such objects are to be found in virtuous deeds; these implant in those who search them out (τοῖς ἱστορήσασι) a zealous eagerness which leads to imitation (ζῆλόν τινα καὶ προθυμίαν ἀγωγὸν εἰς μίμησιν).Footnote 18
In the proem to Demetrius–Antony, Plutarch explains that he also likes to add a few bad figures as exempla e contrario of virtuous conduct.Footnote 19
All of these passages clearly show that Plutarch unmistakably saw his Parallel Lives as an essentially moral project. Yet a problem remains: there is a certain tension between these straightforward programmatic statements, on the one hand, and the subsequent Lives, on the other hand, where such a moral agenda is not always equally clear. In light of this tension, Pelling has argued that the moralism of the Parallel Lives is descriptive rather than protreptic.Footnote 20 Plutarch is not so much interested in giving direct and unequivocal moral advice as in raising and examining different moral questions, challenging the reader and inviting him to further thinking. Pelling's view has been further developed in the seminal study of Duff.Footnote 21 This take on Plutarch's moral agenda in the Parallel Lives is indeed confirmed by the emphasis on careful reflection (ἀναθεωρεῖν) in the proem to Aemilius–Timoleon.Footnote 22 Reading Plutarch's Parallel Lives requires serious and painstaking thinking.
Yet even then problems remain: while some Lives clearly exhibit a moral interest, others are much more historical,Footnote 23 and nearly all Lives in fact contain lengthy sections in which historical events are told without apparent interest in the hero's character or in other moral issues. Jacobs therefore proposes regarding the Parallel Lives more broadly as ‘pragmatic biography’, that is, biography that is concerned not only with moral questions but also with teaching efficient leadership.Footnote 24 She argues that many passages deal with useful political and military conduct that could still be imitated in Plutarch's day, and viewing them from the perspective of ‘pragmatical biography’ better enables us to reveal their full relevance.Footnote 25 Or does it? On closer inspection, such passages do not undermine the traditional, moralizing interpretation either, which can appreciate the lengthy accounts of great military or political achievements as extensive (and often problematizing) descriptions of examples of political and military virtue.Footnote 26 In that respect, the many implicit lessons of efficient leadership which Jacobs has collected and analysed so well can also be considered as part and parcel of Plutarch's rich ethical thinking.
Perhaps some progress can be made by turning to the concept of Plutarch's ‘zetetic philosophy’ as discussed in the previous chapters. The moralism of the Parallel Lives is zetetic moralism: it is moralism that raises questions and searches for the truth.Footnote 27 It takes its point of departure from historical events: the lives of the statesmen and generals of the past, their successes and failings, good and bad decisions. This historical material invites difficult questions and stimulates nuanced philosophical reflection: where in this continuous stream of events can be found traces of moral or immoral behaviour; which fundamental decisions (προαίρεσεις) were taken on the basis of rational considerations; and when did the hero yield instead to his passions? In such an approach, history becomes the matter of philosophy (ἱστορία οἷον ὕλην φιλοσοφίας),Footnote 28 not as a source for dogmatic or doxographical constructions but as an incentive to a dynamic investigation that does not smooth over the complexity of moral questions but ponders them from different perspectives in order to come closer to the truth. For, indeed, zetetic moralism is no noncommittal reflection. We have already seen that Plutarch's ethical thinking makes heavy demands on his readers (see above, Chapter IV) and the same holds true for the moral project of the Parallel Lives.Footnote 29 After all, their heroes are explicitly presented as examples worthy of imitation. We may look into the mirror they present to us and take the time to reflect on their behaviour, but we should not forget to take the consequences, ‘both admiring the works of virtue and emulating those who wrought them’ (Per. 2.2). Such imitation, however, never amounts to slavish and thoughtless copying: zetetic moralism implies careful and considerate looking for the sake of better leaping.Footnote 30
2. The comparative approach
One of the most important characteristics of the Parallel Lives is undoubtedly their comparative approach.Footnote 31 Every book contains a pair of Lives, placing one Greek hero alongside one Roman one. Such juxtaposition yields interesting opportunities, as Plutarch realized very well. In the proem to his Virtues of women, a collection of brief stories about virtuous and brave women illustrating the view that man's virtue and woman's virtue are one and the same (242F–243A), he states (243B–C):
And actually it is not possible to learn better the similarity and difference between the virtues of men and of women from any other source than by putting lives beside lives and actions beside actions, like works of great art, and considering whether the magnificence of Semiramis has the same character and pattern as that of Sesostris, or the cleverness of Tanaquil the same as that of Servius the king, or the high spirit of Porcia the same as that of Brutus, or that of Pelopidas the same as Timocleia's, when compared with due regard to the most important points of identity and influence.
This is the approach that is followed in the Parallel Lives as well: the comparison of two heroes enables Plutarch to inquire into different aspects of their virtues. Moreover, the two protagonists of a pair are not only compared to one another but also to other figures, and the comparative reading may be applied to the Parallel Lives as a whole: by reading several pairs of Lives together, we come across different perspectives on the same events and persons, and thus acquire an even more nuanced understanding of the moral qualities or shortcomings of the characters.Footnote 32
But why did Plutarch bring together one Greek and one Roman? This has given rise to much speculation. An often-repeated view is that of Ziegler, who sees the rationale behind the comparative approach as an attempt
to bring the Greeks and the Romans as the bearers of the empire always closer to each other, to make them always better known to each other and to increase their mutual esteem; to show the Romans that the Greeks are not only despicable Graeculi but that they, especially in the past, had produced men of action who were not inferior to the best Romans; to show the Greeks that the Romans are no barbarians.Footnote 33
Yet it is not evident that a need for such a reconciliation project remained in Plutarch's time, as there was no longer a gap between aristocratic Greeks and Romans.Footnote 34 Accordingly, his intentions could equally well be understood as a project of resistance, consisting of a Greek appropriation of the Roman tradition.Footnote 35 The problem is that Plutarch nowhere explains the motive behind this juxtaposition of Greek and Roman heroes. As a result, all theories about it cannot but remain hypothetical, and yet, frustratingly enough, we cannot simply brush aside the problem. After all, Plutarch deliberately chose and persisted in this peculiar comparative approach. That can only mean that he did not regard it as a by-product.Footnote 36
In my view, the most likely hypothesis is that Plutarch's comparison between Greek and Roman statesmen and generals does not aim at defining and moulding Greek and Roman identity but should primarily be seen in the context of the zetetic moralism of the Parallel Lives. Plutarch usually selects two historically unconnected men who are products of different past histories and cultures. By connecting them in one overarching framework and looking at their careers with the same philosophical questions at the back of his mind, he can explore interesting similarities and differences in their behaviour and fundamental decisions.Footnote 37 His parallels are sometimes criticized as quite artificial and unconvincing: what did the historical Lysander and Sulla really have in common, or Agesilaus and Pompey? Yet such objections fail to see the scope and meaning of such parallels. The great differences in historical context precisely fuel the examination of conduct, character, and decisions. Of course Plutarch did not want to suggest that Pompey was a new Agesilaus, or Crassus a Nicias redivivus. His real interest was in the similarities and differences between their respective characters, virtues, and shortcomings, in how these influenced their decisions, and in the lessons we can still derive from the comparison.
In several pairs, the main philosophical themes are briefly introduced in the programmatic proem. Aemilius–Timoleon, for instance, deals with the relation between the heroes’ prudence and their good luck (Aem. 1.6); Dion–Brutus examines how philosopher-statesmen had to struggle with the unmanageable reality of political life (Dion 1.2–2.2); Pelopidas–Marcellus explores the tension between courage and recklessness (Pel. 2.9–11); and Pericles–Fabius Maximus investigates sublime mildness, justice, and imperturbability in the turmoil of political affairs (Per. 2.5). Such proems, mutatis mutandis, constitute the counterpart of the question raised in a philosophical zetema, in that they bring the issue up for discussion. At the same time, they provide the reader with a first, rudimentary answer, since Plutarch here already anticipates a few core results of the elaborate comparison that will follow. This first clue is then problematized at length in the two subsequent Lives. Those provide two new perspectives on the issue, the latter usually complicating the former, and in this respect recall the ascending structure of a philosophical zetema.Footnote 38 This implies that both of the Lives contain interesting insights and that the second one – while often being more complicated and nuanced – may also obscure issues that are clearer in the first one.
In a formal comparison (synkrisis) of the two heroes, Plutarch finally works towards an overall retrospective evaluation. On the basis of a few general criteria (such as military and political qualities, the death of the hero, his power base, and so on), he assesses the similarities and, especially, the differences between the two protagonists, sometimes preferring the Greek, at other times the Roman, and usually ending up with a fair balance between the two. This concluding evaluation, however, often comes as a surprise, shows less nuance, and repeatedly even flatly contradicts what has been said in the previous Lives. As a result, these synkriseis have often been regarded as mere products of the rhetorical schoolFootnote 39 and have been criticized as unduly trivializing conclusions.Footnote 40 Duff has proposed a more generous reading, by relating the synkriseis to Plutarch's problematizing moralism. In his view, they raise new questions, destabilize the reader's judgement, and thus invite the reader to further reflection. In that sense, they are part and parcel of the moral programme of the Parallel Lives.Footnote 41 Such an interpretation does more justice to Plutarch's zetetic moralism. Here as well, a comparison with the zetemata of the Moralia may help us in understanding the peculiarities and oddities of the synkriseis.
To begin with, what Duff calls their ‘closural dissonance’ should no longer come as a surprise.Footnote 42 Most zetemata in fact show a similar internal inconsistency, collecting as they do irreconcilable answers that all throw light on a part of the truth. In the same way, the synkriseis reveal their part of the truth. Their perspective adds to the previous answers elaborated in the Lives, repeating several of their insights but also challenging or questioning them through new observations. Secondly, we have seen that Plutarch usually places the alternative which he prefers at the end of the list. The implication, of course, is that his preference likewise lies with the view presented in the synkrisis. This has indeed been argued more than once. Boulogne, for instance, sees the synkriseis as Plutarch's attempt to outline an ideal politician by combining the qualities of both heroes.Footnote 43 For Nikolaidis, they are, together with the proems and some digressions, ‘the parts of the Lives where a more authentic Plutarch is revealed; the parts where we can be almost sure that Plutarch speaks for himself and not through his sources’.Footnote 44 Verdegem correctly objects that Plutarch was no slave of his sources in the Lives.Footnote 45 And, indeed, we have seen that the last alternative in a philosophical zetema should not be considered as Plutarch's own final word on the issue. Similarly, the truth of the synkriseis is only a partial truth, to be supplemented with the equally partial truths presented in the two Lives and even in the proem. Nevertheless, this partial truth should be taken seriously.Footnote 46
There still remains a further problem. Pelling observes that some of the synkriseis are ‘thought-diminishing rather than thought-provoking’,Footnote 47 and even Duff agrees that Plutarch is prepared in these synkriseis to ‘speak much more in the black-and-white terms of virtue and vice’.Footnote 48 These are interesting observations: they suggest that, in such cases, the last perspective is not the most nuanced one. Should we, then, retrace our steps and regard the synkriseis as uncritical addenda after all? Not necessarily. We should rather appreciate them as products of a different thinking process. Reading the Lives requires a process of ἀναθεωρεῖν: it involves careful reflection while going through the events (Aem. 1.2; cf. Reg. et imp. apophth. 172E). The synkriseis, on the other hand, are the fruit of ἀποθεωρεῖν:Footnote 49 at this stage, the reader has finished reading the detailed accounts and is now able to look back from a distance at what they have read. They can ponder anew over the two men's lives and weigh their decisions against one another by means of more general criteria. This obviously opens up new opportunities, but also implies bracketing concrete historical details. To a certain extent, the perspective of the synkriseis switches from particular historical events to more philosophical issues, from τί to οἷα. Their ἀποθεώρησις often results in a more straightforwardly philosophical reading of history. This reading still makes use of history as the matter of philosophy, but the philosophical perspective now comes to the fore and this difference of emphasis entails dissonance and new evaluation. But here as well, Plutarch carefully refrains from speaking the last word and rather urges his readers to pass their own judgement.Footnote 50
3. The characterization of the heroes
Plutarch refers to the protagonists of the Parallel Lives as rulers, lawgivers, and generals (Reg. et imp. apophth. 172D). We may wonder in passing why he did not rather write biographies of philosophers. He would have easily found distinguished figures who eminently qualified as moral paradigms: Plato, no doubt, and several of his followers, but also Pythagoras, Socrates,Footnote 51 Aristotle, and, as a negative example, the infamous Epicurus. The obvious problem, of course, was that they spent much of their lives in their schools and thus met with fewer difficult practical dilemmas.Footnote 52 As a result, their lives were probably less interesting for a project of zetetic moralism such as we find in the Parallel Lives.Footnote 53
Plutarch, then, preferred writing about famous politicians and generals, but he wrote about them as a philosopher. Indeed, the general view of humanity that informs the Parallel Lives rests on the same philosophical foundations as the ethical thinking in the Moralia (see above, Chapter IV). In both cases, the theoretical basis is a dichotomy in the soul between reason and the passions, as elaborated in On moral virtue.Footnote 54 This is the philosophical lens through which Plutarch views the careers of the protagonists of history and which shapes the moralism of the Lives. Every hero had to wage his own struggle with his passions and try to overcome them time and again by the powers of his reason. The Parallel Lives contain a kaleidoscope of human passions. Prominent among them, of course, is love of honour (φιλοτιμία), the tireless gadfly of nearly every Plutarchan hero,Footnote 55 but many other passions follow in its wake: Nicias is superstitious, Philopoemen contentious, Coriolanus prone to anger, Crassus greedy, Pelopidas reckless, Dion wilful, Demetrius and Antony lovers of pleasure, and so on.
Furthermore, Plutarch's heroes are ‘great natures’, with potential for great vices and great virtues (Demetr. 1.7).Footnote 56 If they succeed in bringing their passions under rational control, they are capable of the most brilliant virtuous achievements, whereas their failure to do so ends in utter disaster. Everything depends on how strong a grip the hero's reason has on the irrational powers of his soul. No wonder, then, that Plutarch shows a keen interest in his heroes’ attitude towards philosophy in general and notably in their collaboration with philosophers. Many of the heroes were known to have associated with famous thinkers of their day: Pericles with Anaxagoras (Per. 4.5–5.1; 16.8–9; Them. 2.5), Alexander the Great with Aristotle (Alex. 7.2–8.4), Philopoemen with the Academics Ecdemus and Megalophanes (Phil. 1.5), Cleomenes with Sphaerus (Ag./Cleom. 23.2–3; 32.4), Tiberius Gracchus with Blossius of Cumae (TG/CG 8.6; 17.5; 20.5–6), Pompey with Cratippus (Pomp. 75.4–5), and – cause célèbre – Alcibiades with Socrates (Alc. 4.1–4; 6.1; 6.5). Dion was an alumnus of the Academy (Dion 1.2; 17.1; 47.4), just like Phocion (Phoc. 4.2; 14.7) and Cicero (Cic. 3.1; 4.1–3; Luc. 42.3), and Lucullus (Luc. 42.3) and Brutus (Brut. 2.2–3; cf. Dion 1.2) also expressed their preference for the Old Academy. The heroes’ education is another recurrent motif, especially in the Roman Lives: the misbehaviour of Coriolanus (Cor. 1.3–6; 15.4–5), Flamininus (Flam. 1.4), and Marius (Mar. 2.2) can be explained by their lack of an appropriate paideia, whereas Marcellus (Marc. 1.3; 21.4; 21.7) and Lucullus (Luc. 1.6; 42.4) illustrate what can be gained from an adequate Greek education.Footnote 57
All of this raises the question to what extent Plutarch's moralizing agenda in the Parallel Lives enables him to do justice to the individual nature of his heroes. The Lives are no moral treatises, of course,Footnote 58 nor general sermons on particular vices,Footnote 59 but they do not lay bare all the idiosyncratic peculiarities of the different protagonists either. In other words, these protagonists are staged as characters rather than personalities.Footnote 60 Plutarch sees them as moral agents with a relatively fixed set of qualities and failures, and he likes to exemplify key aspects of their character (ἦθος) through well-chosen anecdotes which contain a snapshot of their basic nature.Footnote 61 They are not simplified stereotypes, however, but ‘integrated characters’ that are gradually coloured in as the Life goes on, though without ending up as lifelike, psychologically complicated personalities.Footnote 62
Nevertheless, Plutarch's heroes do have distinctive individual features.Footnote 63 For surely there was only one Alcibiades. And how could there be a second Sulla, or Alexander, or Antony?Footnote 64 On the one hand, their idiosyncrasies are seen from a general, Platonic point of view. Individuum est ineffabile. If we really want to learn from their lives, we need to have at least some things in common with them. Therefore, a more generalizing, philosophical perspective is a necessary condition. On the other hand, Plutarch's zetetic moralism can only bear full fruit when due attention is given to particularities, to the peculiarity of the historical context but also to the singularity of every hero and to their mutual differences. Only then can we adequately consider whether Pericles’ mildness is entirely the same as that of Fabius Maximus, or in which respects it is different (cf. the passage from Mul. virt. 243B–C quoted above). Only then can we obtain a deeper insight into the specificity of their moral decisions. Moreover, the heroes’ individual character traits interfere with a simple, thoughtless imitation of them – it is evidently not possible to clone Aristides, Timoleon, or Tiberius Gracchus – and thus again stimulate more in-depth moral reflection. In that sense, a discussion of the hero's individual characteristics and nature significantly contributes to the process of moral zetesis. This brings us to the next point.
4. Plutarch's view of historical truth
If the Parallel Lives should be regarded as an essentially moral project, and if the work's central comparative approach and the characterization of the protagonists is thoroughly conditioned by this moral goal, the question remains what this implies for Plutarch's attitude towards historical truth. If he uses history as the mere matter of philosophy, does he adapt this matter at his own discretion to the demands of his philosophy? How, in short, does Plutarch the philosopher relate to Plutarch the historian?
Many scholars have argued that Plutarch's account is often quite unreliable,Footnote 65 that Plutarch simply did not wish to be a historian,Footnote 66 and that the Parallel Lives should be understood as a philosophical project.Footnote 67 Yet he has his defenders too. Badian, for instance, states that ‘Plutarch, when he set his mind to it, could be a critical historian superior to many of the professedly historical writers.’Footnote 68 Indeed, Plutarch was not blind to the bias of his sources (see, e.g., Per. 13.16; Pomp. 10.9; Arat. 38.11–12) and frequently mentions alternative views. Furthermore, he attaches great importance to the plausibility (εἰκότης or πιθανόν) of his account. There is no shortage of passages where he appears as a critical author displaying a sincere concern for the historical truth.
In order to better understand Plutarch's attitude towards historical truth, we may again consider it against the backdrop of the zetetic moralism of the Parallel Lives. To begin with, such zetetic moralism is in principle open to historical facts, whatever they may be. We have repeatedly seen that Plutarch's zetetic philosophy in general enables him to deal with the most diverse aspects of a given problem, including those that are unwelcome from a Platonic point of view. The same basic open-mindedness can be found in the Parallel Lives. In trying to recover what had happened, Plutarch usually saw little need to distort the facts for the sake of a simplifying moralism. Such distortion would sometimes even be counterproductive and would in any case run counter to the spirit of genuine zetetic moralism. A project of zetetic moralism rather presupposes correct and reliable information which can then be questioned and considered from a moral point of view. In other words, zetetic moralism presupposes and includes zetetic historical criticism.
Thus, Plutarch did not want to gloss over his heroes’ mistakes and weaknesses. On the contrary, such flaws often raise interesting moral questions.Footnote 69 They should not be overemphasized, though. In the proem to the Cimon–Lucullus, Plutarch explains that he regards them rather as ‘shortcomings in some virtue than as vile products of vice’ (Cim. 2.5). Elsewhere, he is willing to evaluate them in the light of their time (Comp. Sol. et Publ. 4.4; Cam. 1.2). Nevertheless, they are mentioned and criticized.Footnote 70
Sometimes, the same events are understood differently in different Lives. For instance, Cleomenes’ proposal to give Megalopolis back to its citizens is praised as a reasonable and humane offer in Ag./Cleom. 45.8 but unmasked as a clever trick to seize the city in Phil. 5.3–4. Again, Plutarch denies that Cimon turned to demagogical practices (Cim. 10.8) but elsewhere argues that Pericles was outdone by Cimon's demagogy (καταδημαγωγούμενος, Per. 9.2). His evaluation of Athens’ foreign policy considerably differs in the Life of Phocion and in the Life of Demosthenes, and so on.Footnote 71 These are neither inconsistencies nor distortions of the historical truth, but zetetic attempts to take into account the perspective of the different heroes and the complexity of the historical situation which could be faced from different – even opposite – angles.
Furthermore, in writing the Parallel Lives, Plutarch came across numerous historical situations in which justice was diametrically opposed to efficiency and expediency. Such historical matter is embarrassing for an oversimplifying moralism that without further ado equates justice with usefulness, but it is particularly interesting for a more problematizing zetetic moralism. Typically enough, Plutarch devotes several pairs to this issueFootnote 72 and makes no attempt at an intellectual justification of the heroes’ morally problematic decisions,Footnote 73 simply allowing the facts to speak for themselves and leaving further judgement to his readers. Similarly, quite some attention is given to the influence of fortune and providence on historical events, again an issue with potentially far-reaching philosophical overtones.Footnote 74 Brenk points to a dichotomy between Plutarch's philosophical convictions about the omnipresent working of providence, on the one hand, and his historical writings, which give a much more significant part to fortune, on the other hand, and even goes so far as to call Plutarch ‘a schizophrenic when it comes to tyche’.Footnote 75 I would rather appreciate this tension as one more telling illustration of Plutarch's intellectual honesty. He essentially stuck to the facts and preferred to deal with them for what they were rather than explaining them away from an ivory tower philosophical perspective. All this shows that his moral goals and interests did not interfere with the demands of history and that he had no problem at all in combining concern for moral truth with respect for historical truth.
This, however, is only one side of the picture. Its other side is that zetetic moralism also conditions the historian's outlook and determines his selection and evaluation of his material. And this, in turn, can entail blind spots. For instance, although Plutarch does not entirely ignore economic and social matters, he repeatedly underestimates their importance and overemphasizes the impact of the heroes’ individual decisions. Similarly, military matters are seldom treated in detail, although many battles are mentioned in the Parallel Lives. Plutarch's interest lay primarily in the character and career of his heroes and this posed new problems. Information about their days of glory was not difficult to find, but Plutarch all too often faced gaps in the available sources concerning their childhoods. These he tried to fill through ‘creative reconstruction’, evoking an image of the young hero on the basis of a few well-chosen anecdotes.Footnote 76 As a rule, gross distortions of the historical truth are avoided and Plutarch's reconstructions of the childhood remain within the boundaries of what he would call εὐστόχως λέγειν (‘successful guesswork’; Phoc. 17.6). Finally, the comparative approach can entail reconstructions of a different kind, which may exaggerate minor similarities between the heroes’ character or experiences (see below, Chapter VI, for concrete examples). Again, Plutarch was willing to ‘help his truth along a little’.Footnote 77 In all of these cases, the relation between zetetic moralism and its philosophical truth, on the one hand, and historical truth, on the other, is a complicated one.
The same holds true concerning matters of chronology. A notorious case is Plutarch's version of the famous story of Solon's encounter with Croesus (Sol. 27.1):
As for Solon's meeting with Croesus, some think to prove by chronology that it is fictitious. But when a story is so famous and so well-attested, and, what is more to the point, when it comports so well with the character of Solon, and is so worthy of his magnanimity and wisdom, I do not propose to reject it out of deference to any chronological canons, so called, which thousands keep revising, without to this day being able to bring their contradictions into any general agreement.Footnote 78
Prima facie, this passage suggests that Plutarch here deliberately sacrifices historical to moral truth. On closer inspection, though, the matter is not so simple. To begin with, he at least mentions the chronological problem. If he had only eye for the rich moral message of the story, he could have ignored chronology altogether. Secondly, his position is not unreasonable, given the great dissension among specialists in chronology. In light of these disagreements, simply dismissing the story on chronological grounds does not show careful historical criticism either. In fact, there also appear to be many witnesses who support the story – although Plutarch gives no names; moreover, the story corroborates what we know about Solon's character, an observation that is relevant for the historian and the moralist alike. In that sense, Plutarch's decision to accept the story shows neither complete lack of historical criticism nor an occasional lack of interest in historical truth.Footnote 79 It rather reveals his sense of the limits of historical truth claims and his justified caution (εὐλάβεια) vis-à-vis exaggerated confidence in dubious chronology. His decision to adopt a ‘benefit of the doubt’ approach in such circumstances is far from uncritical and unreasonable.
A similar case concerns the relation of Numa and Pythagoras. Here, too, Plutarch is aware of chronological difficulties. In the first chapter of the Life of Numa, he refers to the view of those who say that Pythagoras lived as many as five generations after Numa (Num. 1.4). This chronological observation is counterbalanced, however, by a lengthy discussion of the many clear correspondences between Pythagoras’ convictions and those of Numa (8.5–20). Plutarch's course thus closely resembles the one he took in the Life of Solon: while again mentioning the chronological problem very clearly and right at the start, he does not hesitate to examine the parallels in detail, while adding, at the end of this discussion, that trying to decide the controversial question of Numa's acquaintance with Pythagoras would show youthful contentiousness (μειρακιώδους φιλονεικίας, 8.21). Thus the note of caution sounded at the outset resounds with even more effect at the end.
Plutarch returns once more to the issue at the end of the Life (Num. 22.5), arguing that ‘we may well be quite indulgent (συγγνώμην ἔχειν πολλήν) with those who are eager (φιλοτιμουμένοις) to prove, on the basis of so many resemblances between them, that Numa was acquainted with Pythagoras’. This, if anything, is a strategically well-considered and subtle judgement. The term φιλοτιμουμένοις recalls, albeit in a slightly more positive register, the youthful contentiousness of the over-enthusiastic believers, and the phrase συγγνώμην ἔχειν suggests not merely that Plutarch bears in mind the demands of chronology but even that the hypothesis of the believers is problematic if not false. At the same time, his argument vindicates the lengthy treatment of the many correspondences. This is, once again, a telling way of both having and eating both one's historical and one's moral cake.
5. Heuristics and method of working
The previous section has shown that zetetic moralism goes hand in hand with careful historical criticism. It also presupposes meticulous heuristics, which leads us to the question of Plutarch's sources.Footnote 80 What did Plutarch read?
He read an awful lot. The Parallel Lives illustrate his erudition no less than the polymathic works of the Moralia (see above, Chapter III). He never limited himself to the most obvious sources but actively looked for interesting new material. In the proem to Nicias–Crassus, he says (Nic. 1.5):
Those deeds which Thucydides and Philistus have set forth – since I cannot entirely pass them by, above all when they indicate the nature of my hero and the disposition which lay hidden beneath his many great sufferings – I have run over briefly, and with no unnecessary detail, in order to escape the reputation of utter carelessness and sloth; but those details which have escaped most writers, and which others have mentioned casually (εἰρημένα σποράδην), or which are found on ancient votive offerings or in public decrees, these I have tried to collect, not massing together useless material of research (ἱστορίαν), but handing on such as furthers the appreciation of character and temperament (κατανόησιν ἤθους καὶ τρόπου).
As usual, the proem should be understood against the background of the following Life, yet it also throws light on a more general problem. The main events in Greek and Roman history had been extensively related by excellent writers before Plutarch. For the Life of Nicias, he could fall back on Thucydides and Philistus; for other Greek Lives, he could rely on Herodotus, Xenophon, Polybius, Ephorus, and Theopompus. All of these were major sources for Plutarch and in one way or another he had to distinguish himself from them. He specifies that his emulation is not of a literary kind – as Thucydides is anyhow beyond imitation (Nic. 1.1; 1.4–5) – but concerns the understanding of the hero's character. In this, he claims, he could still add to authors as inimitable as Thucydides.
To that purpose, he also used other sources and, to find these, he was willing to go more than one extra mile. In the above passage he mentions decrees and inscriptions,Footnote 81 but he also benefited from other contemporary sources, including the writings of the protagonists themselves.Footnote 82 Whenever possible, he supplemented his material through autopsy and hearsay.Footnote 83 Furthermore, for his Roman Lives, he took pains to read Latin sources as well.Footnote 84 In short, all this reveals painstaking research, inspired by the zetetic spirit, in finding the sources.
This zetesis especially comes to the fore in Plutarch's attention to the σποράδην εἰρημένα: not the great outlines of the story that everybody knows from Thucydides but the tiny details, anecdotes, and sayings mentioned in passing by only one author, which provide such interesting material for moral reflection. These fill many pages of the Parallel Lives and also found their way into separate collections like the Sayings of kings and commanders and the Spartan sayings.
The precise relation between these collections of sayings and the Parallel Lives is a matter of scholarly debate. According to Stadter, the Spartan sayings were part of a greater collection which Plutarch used as a source for the Parallel Lives, whereas the Sayings of kings and commanders are a later, edited selection of the big collection.Footnote 85 Pelling, on the other hand, focuses on the Sayings of kings and commanders, which he regards as a fruit of the provisional drafts of the Parallel Lives.Footnote 86 However that may be, the collections of sayings have their own profile, as appears from the dedication letter to Trajan at the outset of the Sayings of kings and commanders.Footnote 87 There, Plutarch says that the collection aims at an understanding of the characters and fundamental choices of leading men (κατανόησιν ἠθῶν καὶ προαιρέσεων ἡγεμονικῶν; 172C). This strikingly resembles his statement in the proem to Nicias–Crassus quoted above. The goal of the collections of sayings, then, is exactly the same as that of the Parallel Lives: they are a project of zetetic moralism. But the collections are also presented as a kind of shortcut. Whereas the reading of the Parallel Lives requires considerable time, the collections of sayings directly focus on the heroes’ pithy statements, which constitute the very core, the ‘samples and seeds of their lives’ (δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα; 172E). The difference between the collections of sayings and the Parallel Lives, then, lies neither in their moral purpose nor in Plutarch's general attitude towards the relevant material – in both cases, history is regarded as the matter of philosophy – but rather has to do with the selection of the material.
Yet this selection does have important implications for the goal of the collections of sayings. Trajan can ruminate on these anecdotes in his rare moments of leisure. He can carefully ponder about and learn from them, come to his conclusions, and take inspiration from them, but the short anecdotes do not allow for the same detailed zetetic reflections as the Parallel Lives. They provide little information about the historical background, about alternative, opposite reactions to the same event, or about negative behaviour. Plutarch's selection thus omits much material that stimulates genuine and nuanced zetesis. He provides his busy reader with a ready-made package of anecdotes that stimulates reflection (ἀναθεώρησιν; 172E) but lacks the depth of the Parallel Lives. In short, the collections of sayings aim at zetetic moralism in its light version.
Back to the Parallel Lives and to Plutarch's method of working. In all likelihood, Plutarch read all the main sources before he began the composition of a Life.Footnote 88 He read them very carefully, paying attention to relevant details,Footnote 89 and taking notes while reading. These notes probably did not contain the basic outlines of the historical events – which Plutarch knew or easily remembered – but it was precisely the casual mentions (σποράδην εἰρημένα) that caught his eye. His careful zetetic heuristics was thus matched by an equally painstaking zetesis in reading the sources.
After Plutarch had finished his reading, he usually selected one principal source. Some Lives largely rest on this main source (like the Life of Nicias or the Life of Coriolanus, respectively based on Thucydides and Dionysius of HalicarnassusFootnote 90), but usually different main sources are used for different sections of a Life.Footnote 91 Relying on this (or these) source(s), he then composed a provisional draft (a ὑπόμνημα).Footnote 92 Whatever was less relevant for his project of zetetic moralism was omitted or shortened, while other material was transposed or added from different sources, sometimes resulting in learned digressions.Footnote 93 This substantial and thorough transformation of the source(s) never became a mechanical process in the hands of the experienced biographer but always required a process of searching reflection. The lens of zetetic moralism is no mere glaze on historical earthenware but entails a new perspective on the hero's career.Footnote 94 Even though the moral interest of the story is seldom made explicit, the underlying zetetic and moralizing spirit still conditions Plutarch's overall interpretation and evaluation of his material. His solid zetesis in finding and reading the sources was thus completed by a painstaking zetesis in transforming them.
While the provisional version in all likelihood already contained the core of Plutarch's view of the hero, it was still a great step to the published version. That step not only required final structuring and literary polishing (dispositio and elocutio) but probably also included the pairing of the two heroes. This obviously necessitated a new process of reflection with further expansion and/or abridgement of the provisional draft. The final result was a product of intensive zetesis inviting further zetesis, well written and well considered, based on careful historical research and nuanced moral reflections, providing attractive and entertaining reading, as well as inspired and inspiring food for thinking.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has only touched on a few important aspects of the Parallel Lives: their moral purpose and comparative approach, Plutarch's dealing with his heroes, and his attitude towards historical truth. There is so much more to say. The ancient historian would certainly want to learn more about Plutarch's reception of the previous historical and biographical tradition; about his historical method and to what extent it differs from, or corresponds to the methodological principles he laid down himself in On the malice of Herodotus (see above, Chapter III, §4); or about his view of Greece and Rome and his treatment of different Greek cities and powers. The philosopher would like to explore the Platonic inspiration of the Parallel Lives in further detail, as it appears from the many links with Plutarch's ethical and political philosophy (including the ideal of the philosopher-king) but also from digressions about epistemological and theological matters and from his view of the working of providence and fortune in the course of history. The literary scholar would find rich opportunities for a narratological study of the Parallel Lives, for an enquiry into their rhetoric, their imagery, their intertextuality, and their relationship with the ‘Second Sophistic’.
Reading the Parallel Lives is like walking in a gallery full of precious statues, being overwhelmed by their variegated beauty and not knowing where to look first. Every statue is unique and repays accurate observation, and their comparison adds a further dimension to the spectator's experience. This comparison between the Parallel Lives and statues was made by Plutarch himself, but he also points to an important difference (Cim. 2.2): ‘We believe that a portrait which reveals character and habits is far more beautiful than one which merely copies body and countenance.’ He had it right: the statues of his Parallel Lives are living indeed. It was Plutarch himself who breathed life into them. His breath of life was that of zetetic moralism. This enabled the lively statues of the Parallel Lives to interact with one another, beyond the spatial and temporal boundaries of their historical existence. In turn it enabled them to interact with Plutarch's readers and, indeed, with all of us.
