¹ Westerholm, Stephen, Israel's Law and the Church's Faith (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1988) 187Google Scholar, points out that Paul here deliberately avoids using the law of Moses to convict the Gentiles. Cf. also Bornkamm, Günther, ‘Die Offenbarung des Zornes Gottes (Rom 1–3)’, Das Ende des Gesetzes: Paulusstudien: Gesammelte Aufsätze Band 1 (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1958) 18–19.Google Scholar

² Dodd, C. H., The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949) 19Google Scholar; cf. also with Barrett, C. K., A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1957) 35Google Scholar; and Goodenough, E. R., ‘Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity’, in Religions in Antiquity (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968) 38Google Scholar; Greenwood, David, ‘Saint Paul and Natural Law’, in Biblical Theology Bulletin 1 (1971) 267Google Scholar, says that ‘St Paul definitely acknowledged a kind of general revelation, and by implication the existence of a universal moral law.’

³ C. H. Dodd, Romans, 24.

⁴ C. K. Barrett, Romans, 35.

⁵ C. K. Barrett, Romans, 35–6; cf. also E. R. Goodenough, ‘Hellenization’, 38; Schoeps, H. J., Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in Light of Jewish Religious History (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961) 34, 224Google Scholar believes that the idea may be taken from Jewish sources, though this is difficult to accept. Lightfoot, J. B., ‘St Paul and Seneca’, in Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians (London: MacMillan, 1881) 289Google Scholar, offers a quotation paralleling Paul's from Seneca (in Augustine Civ. Dei 6.10; de Superst. frg. 31).

⁶ Nock, A. D., ‘Early Gentile Christianity’, Essays on Religion and the Ancient World 1 (ed. Zeph, Stewart; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1972).Google Scholar

⁷ McLure, M. T., ‘The Greek Conception of Nature’, in PhR 2/63 (1934) 123Google Scholar; Burnet, John, ‘Law and Nature in Greek Ethics’, in Essays and Addresses (London: Chatto & Windus, 1930) 23–8Google Scholar; Heinimann, Felix, Nomos und Physis (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965) 89–109.Google Scholar

⁸ Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987) 398–400Google Scholar and the excerpts which precede this discussion in section 63. It is fair to say the παρὰ/κατὰ φύσιν contrast was not unique to the Stoics – it was common since the ethnographers – but it formed the cornerstone of their ethical system.

⁹ For all the talk of following nature and living according to nature, the Greek sources are never really clear on what this amounts to. Epictetus, for instance, gives a few ‘laws of nature’, in 1.29.19; 3.17.6; and frg. 51, but no one can give us the whole. Philo of Alexandria lists more ‘laws’ than anyone else. Homosexuality, which Paul discusses here, was not necessarily regarded as against nature. Zeno seems to accept it, although the later Stoic Musonius Rufus rejects it. Paul's antipathy to homosexuality probably came through Judaism, but the language he uses to express this antipathy is Hellenistic.

The Stoics were not able to say what the wise man would be like because even though his actions would generally be καθήκοντα, there were times when the preferred indifferents (προηγμένα ἀδιάφορα) were not to be chosen. Only the wise man was capable of performing actions which were κατορθώματα, or ‘right’. Only the wise man, therefore, who had ‘all authority over the law’ (Diogenes Laertius 7.125), would be able to divine what the law of nature was. Cf. the articles listed in n. 10 and Gisela Striker, ‘Origins of the Concept of Natural Law’ and Inwood, Brad, ‘Commentary on Striker’, in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (Boston: University Press of America, 1987).Google Scholar

¹⁰ That Paul is not an expert in Stoicism is shown by his slight mistake in his use of this term. More proper, according to Max Pohlenz, would be παρὰ τò καθῆκον: ‘Paulus und die Stoa’, ZNW 42 (1949) 73.Google Scholar This is how Diogenes Laertius uses the term in 7.108–9. He describes the term in detail, including a suspect etymology for it, and attributes its technical usage to Zeno. (Philo, however, on one occasion uses the phrase τò μὸ καθὸκον in Cher. 14, so clearly it is not a grave error on Paul's part.) It should also be made clear that ideas which were καθήκοντα were properly considered of the ‘indifferent’ category. They were morally obligatory, but not ‘good’. This is a difficult topic in Stoic ethics. See Christenson, Johnny, An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1962) 72Google Scholar; Kidd, I. G., ‘Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man’, Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone, 1971) 150Google Scholar; ‘The Relation of Stoic Intermediaries to the Summum Bonum, with Reference to Change in the Stoa’, CQ n.s. 5 (1955) 181–94Google Scholar; ‘Moral Actions and Rules in Stoic Ethics’, The Stoics (ed. John Rist; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1978) 247–58Google Scholar; Rist, John, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1969) 97–111Google Scholar; White, Nicholas P., ‘Stoic Values’, Monist 73/1 (Jan., 1990) 42–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Two Notes on Stoic Terminology’, AJP 99 (1978) 111–19Google Scholar; Inwood, Brad, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University, 1985).Google Scholar

¹¹ There is yet another issue here which Paul may have confused. Things which are καθήκοντα in Stoic thought are not concerned with man's final nature, they are those things which should be chosen (προηγμένα) of the indifferents (ἀδιάφορα). See the articles listed in the two previous footnotes. More proper would have been to call these acts, from Paul's point of view, κακοί.

¹² There is general agreement that the vice list here, and those found elsewhere in Paul's letters, owe something to Hellenistic vice lists: C. K. Barrett, Romans, 40; C. H. Dodd, Romans, 27; Black, Matthew, Romans (New Century Bible; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989) 28–32, 42Google Scholar. Stowers, Stanley, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans (SBLDS 57. Chico, Calif.: Scholars, 1981) 89–90, 95–6Google Scholar presents both formal characteristics and examples of Hellenistic vice lists, e.g., those of Plutarch, Seneca, and Epictetus. Whether there exists direct Stoic influence, as Wilckens, Ulrich, Der Brief and die Römer 1 (EKK; Zurich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1978) 111–12Google Scholar, argues, is difficult to determine. Käsemann, E., Commentary on Romans (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1980) 49Google Scholar believes that direct Stoic influence is not present.

¹³ C. K. Barrett, Romans, 40; H. J. Schoeps, Paul, 224.

¹⁴ It is possible too that Rom 1.22 is a reference to the Stoics. The Stoics divided humankind into the wise and the fools. Between virtue and vice, there exists no intermediate position: only the wise are wise; all others are foolish (Diogenes Laertius 7.127). Paul seems to turn this on the Stoics: claiming to be ‘wise’ (σοφοί), they became ‘fools’ (ἐμωράνθησαν). This may also explain the god in the shape of mortal man in Rom 1.23. Seneca, for instance, considered the wise man the equal to, or superior of, the gods. He is like a god because he becomes wise through perfect reason and obedience to nature (87.19). His soul is proper for the gods (92.3) and he is as happy as a god (73.14). And though Seneca argues that the wise man remains only a man (71.27), Marion Altman has pointed out that in some ways the wise man in Seneca is in fact superior to the gods (Altman, Marian, ‘Ruler Cult in Seneca’, Classical Philology 33 [1938] 202)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It is also possible that Paul is here referring to the statues and representations of gods throughout the Greek world. Cf. J. B. Lightfoot, ‘St Paul and Seneca’, 289.

¹⁵ Meyer, B. F., The Early Christians (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1986) 200.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. Stowers, The Diatribe, 110–12 on this point, and on the relationship of 2.1–5 to Hellenistic diatribe literature.

¹⁷ Stowers, The Diatribe, 112.

¹⁸ Ulrich Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 132.

¹⁹ Westerholm, Israel, 129; cf. also 130, 145, 151–64.

²⁰ See Räisänen, Heikki, Paul and the Law (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 25–6, 101–9.Google Scholar

²¹ David Greenwood, ‘Saint Paul and Natural Law’, 264 believes that this phrase is similar to Aristotle, NE 1128A. This is so, but the idea more generally relates to the Stoic idea of a law of nature, as I will argue shortly. Bornkamm, Günther, ‘Gesetz und Natur (Rom 2.14–16)’, Studien zu Antike und Urchristentum (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1959) 101–2Google Scholar breaks down the elements in the passage of the law of nature. He believes the passage is ‘allein aus griechischen Denken verständlich’ (104).

²² How nature is related to conscience is not clear: is conscience the manifestation of nature in the individual? The concept is discussed in full in Eckstein, Hans-Joachim, Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1983) 164–79, 311–12Google Scholar. Eckstein sees conscience as necessary for the individual to understand the law done by nature (164). The law done by nature and conscience is not, however, identifiable (168). Eckstein does not see συνείδησις as only ‘schwerzendem moralischem Wissen’ or ‘Ankläger’ (175). For Paul, it is much more an objective and personified ‘Instanz’, or Court (179). It is therefore ‘ein Beweismittel für das Vorhandensein des “Gesetzes”’ (179).

²³ Räisänen, Law, 106.

²⁴ Against Sanders, E. P., Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 131Google Scholar, who sees it as unlikely that Paul actually composed this passage.

²⁵ Against Eckstein, Syneidesis, 154. See particularly Günther Bornkamm's important article ‘Gesetz und Natur (Rom 2.14–16)’, 93–118 for the argument that what is being discussed is the law of nature. Also David Greenwood, ‘Saint Paul and Natural Law’, 262–79; Knox, W. L., Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity (London: Oxford University, 1944) 32–3Google Scholar misunderstands the νόμος ἔμψυχος concept when he claims it is in play in these verses.

²⁶ Räisänen, Law, 105; Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer, 133; David Greenwood, ‘Saint Paul and Natural Law’, 273; Günther Bornkamm, ‘Gesetz und Natur’, 209; Schlier, Heinrich, Der Romerbrief (HTKNT; Freiburg: Herder, 1977) 75–80Google Scholar argues that not all Gentiles are in view, ‘nur einzelne’. Perhaps only one or two could achieve success, but Paul has in view all Gentiles.

²⁷ If Paul has in mind Gentile Christians in this passage, he is in danger of creating a true natural theology, one which would rival Christ and his Spirit in the Christian community. There would exist Gentile Christians who by nature, not the guidance of the Spirit, did the things of the law. They would also do these things by virtue of their own goodness, not by virtue of their new status in Christ. These considerations weigh against Paul having Gentile Christians in mind in this passage.

²⁸ That it is only an individual concrete act or deed cannot seriously be maintained. Greenwood, ‘Saint Paul and Natural Law’, 266 says that it is not the law of nature but a universal moral law. He calls this law the ‘law of the Gentiles’. I think this is a problem of semantics. The law in Rom 2.14 fulfils the function of the law of nature. In terms of content, it is not clear of what this law consists, but, then, the same can be said of the law of nature.

I do not think that Paul has the Noachide commandments in mind in this passage either. Paul is quite clear that the law which the Gentiles follow is the same law which the Jews possess. This is made quite clear again in Rom 2.26, 27. Cf. Räisänen, Law, 103. There is another question as to the date of these commandments and whether they found ‘codification’ at the time of Paul's writing; I think it is unlikely.

²⁹ Räisänen, Law, 26–8. I would disagree that Paul tacitly reduces the law to its moral aspects only. It is also possible that Paul considered the Mosaic law the law of nature, that is, the law which reason would have revealed, as did Philo (Opif. 3). That is, the law which nature revealed to the Gentiles met the δικαίωμα of the law of Moses. How the Gentiles would have done this law is another question. Nevertheless, however the Gentiles did the law, the law they did was sufficient to be considered all of the law for Paul.

³⁰ C. H. Dodd, Romans, 37; Colet, John, An Exposition of St Paul's Epistle to the Romans (trans. Lupton, J. H.; repr. Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg, 1965) 4–5Google Scholar; Pohlenz, Paulus, 75.

³¹ Räisänen, Law, 106.

³² Räisänen, Law, 103–4; Pohlenz, ‘Paulus’, 75.

³³ Räisänen, Law, 103–4.

³⁴ Dunn, James D. G., ‘Paul's Epistle to the Romans: An Analysis’, ANRW 2Google Scholar. 25.4, 2850 says, ‘Not to be ignored is the fact that it is the law as ethical standard which is commended here, over against the law in its function as a boundary marking off Jews as an entity from the rest of mankind.’

³⁵ We have lost our sense of awe over the inclusion of the Gentiles in the salvation plan. Ben F. Meyer, ‘Election-Historical Thinking in Romans 9–11, and Ourselves’, Ex Auditu 1989, 2 sees many of the problems associated with the interpretation of Rom 9–11 stemming from the fact that ‘among gentile Christians a generation or two later, there was no longer the sheer wonder that even Gentiles could be saved’. Rom 2.14–16 ought to be approached as its first readers, and writer, would have viewed the inclusion of Gentiles over Jews, even theoretically: with wonder.

³⁶ It is true that the sense of ὄταν we seek is not often attested in Paul (cf. 1 Cor 3.4) or elsewhere in the NT (cf. 1 Tim 5.11), but the sense of ὄταν which we seek is not uncommon usage and the context is the key. My interpretation rests upon my understanding of the Stoic context.

³⁷ Bauer, Walter, F, William. Arndt, , and Gingrich, F. Wilbur, Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur (4th German edition; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1952) 1069Google Scholar; cf. also Blass, F. and Debrunner, A., A Greek Grammar of the New Testament (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961) 192–3Google Scholar, §380–1, §382, 4b

³⁸ Liddell, and Scott, , Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978) 1264.Google Scholar

³⁹ Strabo Geography 5 (LCL).

⁴⁰ Cf. also Homer Iliad 1.519; Ign. Eph. 8.1.

⁴¹ John Colet, An Exposition of St Paul's Epistle to the Romans, 4 states that ‘in this place it must be remarked, that St Paul means not that the Gentiles, or any Gentile man, had lived rightly without the Law’. This may, indeed, be the case.

⁴² C. H. Dodd, Romans, 35–7; C. K. Barrett, Romans, 52–3; A. D. Nock, ‘Early Gentile Christianity’, 125.

⁴³ Waerdt, Peter vander, The Stoic Theory of Natural Law (diss. Princeton, 1989) 34.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Watson, Gerard, ‘The Natural Law and Stoicism’, Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone, 1971) 216.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For example, Cicero was not certain if there had been a wise man. He vacillates between saying there were none (De Off. 3.16; De Rep. 3.7) and saying that there were a handful (De Nat. Deor. 1.23).

⁴⁶ Especially Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.38–42; Against the Logicians 1.432; Against the Physicists 1.133; Against the Ethicists 1.181. Or Horace Epist. 1.1.106–8: the Sage is ‘second only to Zeus: rich, free, honoured, beautiful, king of kings, especially while he is healthy and not troubled by a cold’.

⁴⁷ Edelstein, Ludwig, The Meaning of Stoicism (Cambridge, Mass., 1966) 11–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ Kerferd, G. B., ‘What Does the Wise Man Know?’, Stoic Philosophy (ed. John, Rist; Cambridge, 1969) 126–7Google Scholar; Zeller, Eduard, Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (London: Longmans and Green, 1870) 294Google Scholar; J. M. Rist, The Stoics, 267.

⁴⁹ The law of nature would be done by the sage, if he could be found. Only he, however, would know the law of nature. This leads to the problem of content. What was in the law of nature? No one knew for sure, although people made attempts at defining individual laws. But apart from a smattering of individual laws here and there in the works of various writers, the law of nature was contentless. As Michael Lapidge put it: ‘one looks in vain for how man was to live in harmony with universal nature’ (‘Stoic Cosmology’, The Stoics, 162). Wisdom was what the wise man thought (John Rist, The Stoics, 267). Only he could know the natural law.

⁵⁰ His readers would have known this to be true even if Paul is claiming that some form of the Mosaic law is the natural law; after all, no one in the Graeco-Roman world could say with certainty of what the law of nature comprised. Paul was on safe ground here too.

A number of other writers in the Jewish world had made these connections previous to Paul. On the general connections between the law of Moses and nature (or wisdom/virtue) or the law of nature made by other Jewish writers see 4 Maccabees 1.8–9, 15–18, 28–30, 34–5; 2.6, 23; 3.17–18; 5.17–26; 6.31–5; 7.7–9; 13.1–6, 16–18; 16.1–3; 18.1–3 and Wisdom of Solomon. The passages from Philo of Alexandria are too numerous to mention in total. Some important passages are found in Opif. 2–3; Decal. 1; Abr. 4–6; Mos. 2.12, 14, 48, 51–2, 211; Spec. 2.163; 4.164, 179; QE 2.42.