Much of the scholarship on democratization in China falls into roughly two camps. Some argue that democracy in China is or will be a bottom-up process. Others aver that it will be an elite-driven top-down phenomenon. Bruce Gilley is firmly in the second camp. He argues that democratization is likely to occur as China's more moderate and liberal leaders recognize, in the face of “a multiple metastatic dysfunction,” the tenuous hold they have on China and move toward democratization as a means of minimizing their losses.
In the first section of the book (“Crisis”), Gilley discusses the challenges faced by China (Chapters 1–3), as well as possible trends toward democratization (Chapter 4). His description of China's ills is set in extremely sharp relief. Chapter 4 is an improvement, and its more optimistic picture of China is more nuanced.
The middle section (“Transition”) provides the linchpin for the analysis. Gilley weighs different democratization scenarios, concluding that China's leaders will most likely institute radical systemic change in response to economic and social crises. Here, he makes three useful, albeit largely self-evident, points. First, there seems to be a general consensus among the top leadership that the economic and social status quo is untenable (although this does not mean that they are in favor of democracy; the People's Republic of China [PRC] always took an activist approach to governance). Second, it seems likely that substantive political reform will be more evolutionary than revolutionary and will involve at least some degree of elite cooperation and accommodation. Third, the army is unlikely to allow itself to be pushed into another situation like that in 1989 when it was ordered to shoot indiscriminately at Chinese civilians.
These reasoned claims are overwhelmed by other, more controversial ones, however. The implosion of the political center is not likely to lead to chaos, writes Gilley: “[I]ndeed, the social atmosphere would likely be quite the opposite, recalling the heady feelings of mutual respect and love—a veritable Woodstock—that broke out during Tiananmen” (p. 141). This analogy betrays a misunderstanding of Tiananmen, particularly the very undemocratic rise of radicals like Chai Ling and Wu'er Kaixi. Nor is Xinjiang or Tibet likely to be satisfied with a “high degree of autonomy.” Arguably, they are likely to exploit the turmoil to secure their independence. Gilley also underestimates the problems of disentangling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a post-CCP system: “China should be in a good position on all counts. A caretaker government could quickly deploy the old CCP system for new purposes” (p. 138).
The final section (“Consolidation”) lays out the challenges that the new regime will face once the euphoria of regime change wears off. It contains chapters on the political challenges facing consolidation, the nature of postdemocratic economic and social life, and China's kindler, gentler foreign policy and international behavior. It is a somewhat futile exercise to evaluate these longer-term predictions and prescriptions. The cavalier and presumptuous tone of this section, however, may be off-putting to some.
Gilley writes with flair and his prose makes for engaging reading. Nevertheless, there are some fundamental problems with his argument. First, in the shift toward democratization, everything hinges on what he describes as “the pact” encompassing “the motivations the parties have for embracing it,” one normative (“the … belief that democracy is the best thing for the country” [p. 129]) and the other instrumental (“[a]ny attempt to recentralize power or repress protest would lead to fissures and breakaways because it would be illegitimate” [p. 129]). I agree with Gilley that the normative explanation is probably the “weaker of the two” (p. 129). However, his “instrumental” motivation is nothing more than a restatement of the normative one, that is, that only democracy is “legitimate.” Such an a priori explanation of why China is likely to democratize courts tautology.
Second, Gilley identifies elite-led “retreat” as the principal dynamic of China's democratization. Although there is some merit to the argument, he avoids the far more intractable problem of how to extend this to the local levels. Indeed, he does not even ask the fundamental question of how local elites must necessarily follow the lead set by Beijing, especially if they perceive such democratization as against their immediate interests. Of course, some local leaders may go along, as he implies, but given the complexity of China's increasingly decentralized political infrastructure, there is a high probability that such efforts at elite-led democratization would run into a collective-action problem of a gargantuan scale. This is something the author assumes away by asserting that local governments will welcome a de jure federalism from what he curiously describes as “the unitary state in which virtually all power resides in Beijing” (p. 167).
Third, predicting what will happen in China is a thankless task because of China's oft-demonstrated unpredictability, from the makeup of the next Politburo Standing Committee to how the country might democratize. But Gilley insulates himself from this by asserting that “[o]ne of the risks of writing a book about the future is being wrong. The other risk is being right too soon” (p. 249). In so doing, he makes it practically impossible to falsify his claims.
Finally, there are a number of dubious statements in the book. Some are problems of interpretation. Gilley seems to fundamentally misunderstand the Hundred Flowers movement: “Democrats made a last-gasp effort in 1956 [sic] to force the CCP to make good on its promises” (p. 19). On the same page, he labels Deng Xiaoping a “sycophant” of Mao Zedong. Others are factual inaccuracies, such as the “strike hard” campaign beginning in 1995 (it started in 1983). There are also several instances where Gilley seems to contradict himself, or at least confuse the reader: “Today [the army] thinks independently of the Party” (p. 111) but “China's military has never been an independent political force” (p. 112).
Moreover, there is a dearth of the author's own personal observations of China, and as a result, the book has a strange at-arm's-length quality. In some cases, it strains credulity altogether: “When you step across the border into Guangdong from Hong Kong—Cantonese societies both—the joie de vivre of life in a free society is replaced by the torpor of life under dictatorship” (p. 46) is but one example. Such an observation is simply baffling. The same is true with the statement that “[t]he rule of law and the legislative and judicial organs were respected and workable in the late PRC era” (p. 138). And his overreliance on Chinese intellectuals as representative barometers of Chinese society adds to this disconnectedness.
At best, then, China's Democratic Future demonstrates a modest breadth of knowledge without the depth necessary to make it a credible scholarly work, even if the intention of the book is to constructively shake up the conventional wisdom by overstating its case. It might be appropriate for some undergraduate or graduate course syllabi as a thought-provoking, book-length think piece, but not as a serious scholarly analysis.
