The 9/11 attacks have already produced a substantial literature that seeks to explain the roots of Al Qaeda's strategy of targeting the United States. Explanations range from simplistic statements—“They hate us,” “They hate freedom”—to arguments about revenge or punishment for various American policy choices, to more complex arguments that Osama bin Laden and his associates sought to draw America into a trap of sorts. One problem, of course, is that no one really has much of an idea of precisely what led bin Ladin and his top associates to plot the 9/11 attacks. Scholars do not, quite frankly, have a lot to work with here.
Fawaz A. Gerges is convinced that most accounts of 9/11 are flawed. His own research relies heavily on reading available accounts written by Islamist activists—he uses the term jihadis to refer to those who see violent jihad as a legitimate means for advancing Islamist goals—and on interviews with many former jihadis. Like many others, he places emphasis on the ideological legacy of Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb, whose 1964 book Signposts is a reference work for those who justify violence against fellow Muslims because of their apostate views and behavior.
What is most distinctive in Gerges's study is his insistence on the relatively marginal role that Al Qaeda and bin Laden have played within the larger jihadi movement. On the whole, his argument is convincing but needs to be examined carefully. He correctly notes that radical Islamism took root in places like Egypt and Algeria in the 1970s–90s timeframe largely as a response to repressive regimes. The targets of Islamist violence were primarily the “near enemy”—the existing governments that had often been very forceful in repressing Islamist currents at home.
The other and interrelated source of radical Islam during the 1980s was the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, which was supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States. This is where bin Laden and many other of his generation got their first taste of jihad—this time with the full blessing of the United States.
By the mid-1990s, this current of jihad had suffered severe setbacks. The Egyptian and Algerian regimes, for example, cracked down brutally on the armed Islamists in their midst, forcing some of them to accept a truce, while others fled into exile. Among those who fled were a number of Egyptians who ended up in Afghanistan, alongside bin Laden. Most prominent was Ayman al-Zawahiri. He and bin Laden merged their respective followers to form Al Qaeda in the late 1990s. What was unique about Al Qaeda, according to Gerges, was its insistence on striking at the “far enemy,” rather than to continue the futile struggle against entrenched regimes in Cairo, Algiers, or Riyadh. One of Gerges's most significant contributions is his demonstration, with ample quotations from relevant sources, that many jihadis felt that this strategy would be suicidal and would distract from the need to keep the focus on the home front.
Gerges correctly says that the personalities of bin Laden and Zawahiri counted for a great deal in setting the strategy for Al Qaeda. Neither of these men listened much to their associates. Both were intensely committed to the struggle against the United States and demanded deference from those around them. Gerges picks up more than a few hints that bin Laden and Zawahiri did not always see eye to eye, and that factionalism ran rampant within Al Qaeda and the broader jihad movement. He correctly points out that such factionalism is quite common within extremist movements.
For all the rich information provided by Gerges, I am still not sure what he thinks caused bin Laden to plan 9/11. He says that “transnational jihad,” with America as the target, provided a new opportunity for jihadis after the heroic defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan (pp. 132–33), and that bin Laden and Zawahiri “plunged into a confrontation with the United States, hoping that it would serve as a galvanizing and unifying experience” (p. 190). In short, the decline of jihad after the victory in Afghanistan and the defeats at the hands of the “near enemy” required something new and dramatic.
That explanation is fine as far as it goes. But did bin Laden also think a few steps further and imagine that the United States would react in ways that might produce a new generation of jihadis? That is not so clear from Gerges's analysis. Some have made such an argument explicitly, and Gerges seems to agree when he says, in passing, that the U.S. response to 9/11—declaring “a worldwide war against a nonconventional, paramilitary foe with a tiny or no social base of support and try[ing] to settle scores with old regional dictators”—was “exactly what bin Laden and his senior associates had hoped the United States would do” (p. 271). He also fears that Iraq may provide second-generation transnational jihadis with revived prospects. But overall, he is convinced that jihadis are an endangered species, that their moment has come and gone (p. 222, “the sinking jihadist ship”). If we analyze carefully what they say and do, we will see that they have little support among Muslims, and that the tide of public support has turned against them. I think Gerges is right, but even a small, alienated, unpopular movement that is determined enough can cause a great deal of trouble.
While readers will learn a great deal from this book, especially about the internal debates among jihadis, there are some shortcomings. I think that Gerges draws too much of his information from Egyptian sources, while paying little attention to Algerians, Palestinians, Saudis, or Pakistanis. In addition, some of the memoirs that he relies on were written by jihadis in prison, and some of what they say (praise of Anwar Sadat, pp. 208–9) must be taken with a grain of salt. He does not exactly say that some of his informants were also imprisoned, but it seems as if that may have been the case. That does not necessarily discredit their testimony, but it is important to know the conditions in which such interviews take place.
Gerges provides a generally convincing account of the why jihad went global. His book deserves to be widely read. But the topic is so much a part of today's headlines that I wish he and his editors had resisted the temptation to get into print so quickly and tried to address current policy issues, such as Iraq. The resulting text will show its age quickly, as current events take whatever turn they are going to take. And the book as it stands seems rushed, often repetitive, sometimes poorly edited, and a bit too insistent that the author is presenting a “nuanced” and “complex” account, presumably in contrast to the simplistic and obvious accounts written by others. The analysis is good enough to speak for itself without the self-promotion that introduces it. These are small matters in an important book, but they are an unnecessary distraction.
