This is a welcome and innovative book, at least in its basic intent. The innovation resides mainly in the correlation between a prominent strand in Western social and political thought—the Frankfurt School program of “critical theory”—and a major phenomenon of contemporary political life: the process of globalization. In many ways, this correlation goes against the dominant academic grain. At least as cultivated in American academia, political theory tends to be mainly retrospective and concerned with the rehearsal of time-honored texts, often with a pronounced slant against contaminating theorizing with mundane affairs. On the other hand, examination of current developments—including the process of globalization—tends to be left to journalists or else to specialists in international politics with little or no background in traditions of political thought. In this respect, the present volume is a breakthrough. It deliberately seeks to bring the insights of the Frankfurt School program to bear on ongoing discussions about global politics, economics, science, and aesthetics. All the contributors, including the editor, are distinguished scholars with solid reputations grounded in the traditions of critical theory and adjacent theoretical paradigms.
In his Introduction, Max Pensky ably pinpoints the challenges involved in the attempt at “globalizing theory and theorizing globalization.” As he observes (p. 1), available literature demonstrates the extent to which work on globalization has “for the most part further entrenched rather than unified academic distinctions.” As a result, theories of globalization tend to be “multiple and discordant, reflecting not only the mutual indifference of various disciplinary projects … but often incommensurate theoretical axioms and methodological assumptions.” Looking at it from a different angle, Pensky discerns in the prevailing situation not only a problem but also an opportunity: the chance of preserving theoretical diversity against globalizing uniformity. In his words (p. 2), the “messy pluralism of current theories of globalization” can also be seen as “a very desirable development: the abandonment of the last remnant of an outdated ideology of absolute theoretical mastery, the idea that a single, unified theory is intrinsically preferable to a lot of disunited ones.” Actually, in Derridean terms (not necessarily congruent with Frankfurt School premises), the very notion of globalizing theory exhibits a paradox: because of the ultimate “impossibility of anything fixed, total, comprehensible, or global.” In putting together his volume, Pensky has tried to tackle this paradox by asking scholars steeped in the Frankfurt legacy to show (p. 4) “how globalization theory is critical theory and, conversely, how critical theory is a theory of globalization.”
To achieve his goal for the volume, Pensky lists three requirements or desiderata: thoroughgoing “self-reflexivity,” resolute “interdisciplinarity,” and adoption of a “weak foundationalism” (p. 4). In terms of the Introduction, self-reflexivity is basically a synonym for “critical” and “dialectical” methodology. A self-reflexive approach, he notes (pp. 4–5), has to “include the social, political, economic, and cultural conditions and contexts for its production within the purview of things that theory needs to explain.” Interdisciplinarity harkens back to the model of the early Frankfurt Institute where each participant represented a “different but not incommensurable set of disciplinary postulates and methods,” while simultaneously being committed to a shared research project (p. 6). The notion of a “weak foundationalism” derives largely from the work of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, which suggests (p. 9) that “the weakest possible rational foundationalism is also the best and that such a weak version will consist of a set of justificatory performances rather than a precise taxonomy of moral truths.” For Pensky, echoing again Habermasian preferences, the “best form” of weak foundationalism would be one (p. 10) that “somehow combined a thin conception of rationality and a substantive philosophical anthropology regarding how humans respond to sudden and epochal cultural transformations … and how they accommodate difference and newness in the form of cultural hybridization.”
The volume opens with two prominent statements defending globalization, normatively construed, against hegemonic unilateralism: first, Habermas's condemnation of the invasion of Iraq, and next, the plea issued by both Habermas and Jacques Derrida on behalf of a common European foreign policy. Congruent with one of Habermas's central concerns, the second part of the volume addresses the contemporary need for a “global public sphere.” Critiquing the nationalist bias in traditional conceptions of the public sphere, Nancy Fraser seeks to open these construals in the direction of “transnationality,” while James Bohman—concerned about the democratic deficit in many transnational institutions—aims to increase the “democratic influence over globalization” (p. 50) through the cultivation of a “multiperspectival” public sphere. Relying largely on Kantian teachings, Maria Pia Lara proposes to move global interactions in the direction of a “globalizing justice” and “cosmopolitan solidarity” (p. 72), while Peter Uwe Hohendahl explores the model of a “transnational university” by asking (p. 89) what happens to such a model “when the public sphere has openly transcended national borders and reflects global concerns?”
The third part of the volume deals with issues of memory and forgetting. Lifting up the “Eurocentric” background, Clay Steinman charges the Frankfurt School with (limited) complicity in “whiteness theory” and the European legacies of slavery and colonialism. Turning to the history of the United States, Thomas McCarthy finds that the country has not yet faced up to its past and adequately developed a “politics of the memory of slavery” (p. 138). Complicating matters somewhat, Andreas Huyssen counsels that memory politics has to be seconded in some contexts by a politics of “forgetting.”
The concluding part assembles various “globalizing visions” or trajectories. Focusing on the theory of science, Eduardo Mendieta (p. 189) advocates the transformation of critical theory into “a geopolitical critique of the political economy of knowledge(s)”; in turn, F. Scott Scribner promotes the enrichment of critical theory through the resources of television and global media technology. With an animus against Theodor Adorno, Carsten Strathausen proposes to replace traditional aesthetic theory with “media aesthetics” (p. 231), while Silvia L. López ponders the positive repercussions of Adorno's aesthetics in Brazil.
The volume is clearly impressive and I heartily applaud its intent. My reservations concern mainly two kinds of deficit: first, a deficit of theoretical openness, and secondly, a shortfall of democratic globalism. As indicated, Pensky defends a “messy theoretical pluralism” against the “outdated ideology of absolute theoretical mastery”; likewise, Bohman endorses the notion of a “multiperspectival public sphere.” Yet the dominant perspective in the volume is Habermasian or Frankfurtian in a narrow sense, with little hospitality shown to other perspectives. What Pensky has to say (p. 8) about “Heidegger's fundamental ontology,” “Foucauldian social philosophy,” “British cultural studies,” and “Derridean deconstruction” does not convey much sensitivity for theoretical pluralism. Can the Frankfurt School still claim a monopoly or “mastery” of critical thought? More serious is the shortfall of genuine globalism. Steinman speaks of the lingering Eurocentrism of critical theory. Even though absolving the Frankfurt School of blatant bias, Pensky acknowledges (p. 11) that the School has “remained tied to a small set of cognitive commitments underlying the European experience” and hence inherited “the paradoxical legacy of a parochial theory of the West that defended its own parochialism with global claims about the agency of its object.”
In light of this situation, the volume's title becomes problematical: Does “globalizing critical theory” mean globalizing the Frankfurt perspective, thus theoretically colonizing the world? With the exception of Mendieta and López, the essays are all written from the center, not the periphery. One misses critical voices from Asia, India, the Muslim world, and Africa. As Pensky admits (p. 12): “Critical globalization theory would need to learn to travel.” Indeed, a lot a traveling still seems required to assist in the emergence of a viable global public sphere.
