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Are There Rival, Incommensurable Theories?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Dale W. Moberg*
Affiliation:
Hobart & William Smith Colleges and University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Abstract

Following an account of the incommensurability argument, an objection, based on assumptions concerning rival theories, is examined and rejected. This rejection leads to an alternative direction of criticism of incommensurability, a direction that involves the articulation of comparative standards of theory evaluation that are independent of meaning invariance.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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