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Beliefs and Subdoxastic States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stephen P. Stich*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland

Abstract

It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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