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Better Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Howard Darmstadter*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts at Boston

Abstract

It is argued that a better theory neither (I) proves better at enabling us to realize our goals, nor (II) enables us to make more accurate predictions than a worse theory. (I) fails because it, tacitly, erroneously assumes, in talking of our goals, that individual preferences for theories can be aggregated into a social preference ordering; (II) fails because it cannot distinguish between important and unimportant predictions. Neither of these failures can be patched up by appealing to the notion of a true theory. The conclusion is that we as yet possess no adequate understanding of the relationships among theoretical progress, goal realization, and predictive accuracy.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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