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Causal Independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Igal Kvart
Igal Kvart*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department Hebrew University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Philosophy Department, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
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Abstract

In Kvart (1991a), I discussed the analysis of causal relevance presented in A Theory of Counterfactuals (1986) (and first in 1975). I explained there in what respect the notion captured by the analysis of Kvart (1986) is a mere approximation to the requisite notion of causal relevance. In this paper I present another analysis of causal relevance, devoid of the shortcoming of its predecessor.

The present analysis of causal relevance is, again, grounded in a chancelike notion of objective probability. The correlative notion of causal independence is analyzed as holding in case there is a so-called causal impact series, which is defined here. The basic notions used for this analysis are the notion of a differentiator, which upsets an equiprobability case, and that of a blocker, which restores it.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 61 , Issue 1 , March 1994, pp. 96 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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