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Cognitive Emergence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Fritz Rohrlich
Fritz Rohrlich*
Affiliation:
Syracuse University
*
†Department of Physics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244–1130; e-mail: rohrlich@syr.edu.
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Abstract

Examination of attempts at theory reduction (S to T) shows that a process of cognitive emergence is involved in which concepts of S, Cs, emerge from T. This permits the ‘bridge laws’ to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability of the Cs with the CT. Cognitive emergence may occur asymptotically or because of similarities of mathematical expressions; it is not necessarily holistic. Mereologically and nonmereologically related theory pairs are considered. Examples are chosen from physics. An important distinction is made between ‘theory reduction’ and ‘reductive explanation’.

Information

Type
Symposium: Emergence and Supervenience: Alternatives to Unity by Reduction
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue S4: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Dec., 1997 , 1997, pp. S346 - S358
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

The author is grateful to several unknown referees for helpful suggestions.

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