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The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ronald N. Giere*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science University of Minnesota
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, 309 Ford Hall, 224 Church Street S.E., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, USA.

Abstract

This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be “mapped” as an array with “horizontal” graded structures, multiply hierarchical “vertical” structures, and local “radial” structures. These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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