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Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Brian Skyrms*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, 500-HOB, University of California at Irvine, Irvine, CA 92717-4555, USA.

Abstract

The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of “ratifiability” is the appropriate generalization of “evolutionarily stable strategy”. The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be selected, and (2) under conditions of perfect correlation a strictly efficient strategy must be selected.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1994

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