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Determinism Versus Continuity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Virgil Hinshaw Jr.
Virgil Hinshaw Jr.*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
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Abstract

Prompted by Alfred Landé's appraisal of individual indeterminacy in both ordinary and quantum games of chance [Mind, n.s. 67: 174-181 (April, 1958)], this paper suggests an alternative assessment in terms of the model-structure of physical theory. Whereas Landé explains such indeterminacy by appeal to “the Leibnitzian principle” of causal continuity, the author sees no need for such a special explanation. Instead, he indicates how the partial interpretation of the kinetic and quantum models limits us to statistical generalities—to limited “areas of relative chance.” The alleged indeterminism of physics thus resides in the model and its partial interpretation in the sense that the statistical nature of statements about “the next throw” or about individual particles is built into the model that enables the scientist to talk at all about such outcomes or entities.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , October 1959, pp. 310 - 324
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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